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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Although Mr. Sunniville's appeal brief contains a statement of the issues, the 
statement does not include any standards of appellate review, as required by Rule 24(a)(5) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Jordan Credit Union therefore restates the 
issues, and sets forth the applicable standards of review, as follows. 
Issue 1: Did the lower court properly consider Mr. Suniville's memorandum in 
opposition (styled "Answer & Memorandum and reply in support of motion to dismiss and 
opposing response to plaintiffs motion for summary judgment")? 
Standard of Review: A ruling on whether to strike (or ignore) an untimely 
memorandum is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Pratt v. Nelson, 2005 UT App 541, 
f 9, 127 P.3d 1256. ("'A ruling thereon, except under circumstances which amount to a 
clear abuse of discretion, will not be disturbed on appeal.'" Pratt, citing Adams v. 
Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 95 Utah 1, 72 P.2d 648, 651 (1937).) 
Issue 2: Was Mr. Suniville entitled to the appointment of counsel in a civil case, 
or, in the alternative, to stay the civil proceedings against him for over a year until he was 
released from prison? 
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Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. 
See State v. Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[W]e consider the trial 
court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and review the 
trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness."). 
Issue 3: Did the lower court appropriately consider Mr. Suniville's otherwise 
inadmissible evidence? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201. 
Issue 4: Did the lower court properly conclude that Jordan Credit Union's 
repossession of the vehicle was commercially reasonable? 
Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is a question of law, which 
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. See Johnson v. 
Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, f 9, 206 P.3d 302. 
Issue 5: Did the lower court properly conclude that Jordan Credit Union's 
repossession and subsequent sale of the vehicle at issue to a salvage yard was commercially 
reasonable? 
Standard of Review: The grant of summary judgment is a question of law, which 
is reviewed for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court. See Johnson v. 
Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, \ 9, 206 P.3d 302. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(l) and (2). Determination of whether conduct 
was commercially reasonable. 
(1) The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection, 
enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different 
method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to 
preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection, enforcement, 
disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially reasonable manner. 
(2) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner 
if the disposition is made: 
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market; 
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the 
disposition; or 
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices 
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a garden-variety collection action for a deficiency owed to Jordan Credit 
Union by Defendant, Harry Suniville. Specifically, Jordan loaned $12,829.00 to Mr. 
Suniville in October 2005, so that he could purchase a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse. Two 
years later, Jordan became aware that Mr. Suniville had been arrested for driving under 
the influence, and that the vehicle had been impounded. Pursuant to the default clause in 
the loan agreement between the parties, Jordan elected to repossess the vehicle (which 
Jordan later discovered had been significantly damaged over time) and accelerate the debt. 
After sending notice to Mr. Suniville's address of record, and after attempting to auction 
the vehicle for two weeks with no bids from any prospective buyers, Jordan sold the 
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vehicle to a salvage company for $200. Jordan then sued Mr. Suniville for the deficiency, 
which was $8,778.12 as of January 26, 2008. 
Mr. Suniville, acting pro se, initially filed a motion to dismiss which was denied. 
Jordan then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, based in 
part, on Mr. Suniville's failure to submit any admissible evidence in opposition to the 
motion. Mr. Suniville appeals from the trial court's Memorandum Decision and Order, 
dated April 6, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because there is no formal statement of facts in Mr. Suniville's opening brief, 
Jordan hereby recites the undisputed facts, as relied upon by the trial court, as follows: 
(Hereafter, all citations to the Record shall be "R. at .") 
1. On or about October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville executed a Retail Installment 
Contract and Security Agreement (hereinafter the "Agreement") in connection with the 
purchase of a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse (hereinafter the "Collateral"). (R. at 119, f A\see 
Exhibit C attached hereto.) 
2. On or about December 3,2007, Mr. Suniville was arrested for driving under 
the influence and the Collateral was impounded. (R. at 34; R. at 128; Ex. C.) 
3. A notice dated December 3,2007 was sent to Jordan from the Utah State Tax 
Commission stating that the Collateral had been impounded. (R. at 128; Ex. C.) 
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4. Mr. Suniville was in default under the Agreement due to his failure to keep 
the Collateral in his possession and because Jordan now believed, in good faith, that Mr. 
Suniville would not be able to continue to perform his obligations under the Agreement. 
(R. at 126; R. at 119 f 7; Ex. C.) 
5. After the Collateral had been in impound for one week, and to protect its 
interests, Jordan elected to repossess the Collateral, retrieving it from the impound lot on 
December 10, 2007. (R. at 119, f 7; Ex. C.) 
6. Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation 
under the Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not 
or could not be performed, is considered a default. (R. at 126, Section "Default"; Ex. C.) 
7. Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several 
remedies listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any 
fees incurred and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount), 
repossession and sale of the collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts 
left owing after the sale, including attorney's fees. {Id.) 
8. On or about December 11, 2007, Jordan sent a letter to Mr. Suniville, at the 
address he provided, stating that the Collateral had been repossessed due to the impound 
action. The letter explained that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00 
and had been added to the loan balance. The letter further stated that the debt had been 
accelerated and directed Mr. Suniville to pay to Jordan the entire loan balance of 
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$9,312.37 on or before December 20, 2007. The letter also stated that failure to do so 
would result in Jordan's sale of the Collateral and that Mr. Suniville would be liable for 
any deficiency between the sale price and the loan balance. (R. at 130; Ex. C.) 
9. Jordan received no subsequent communication from Mr. Sunniville. Hence, 
the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, as is usual and 
customary in the industry. (R. at 120, % 12; Ex. C.) 
10. Jordan received no bids on the Collateral due to its condition. (Id.) 
11. In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the 
vehicle to a mechanic, Ken Martinez, for inspection and evaluation. (R. at 120, f 13; R. 
at 134, ff 4-5; see Ex. C and Ex. D attached hereto.) 
12. The inspection showed that the vehicle had not been kept in good condition 
and repair as required by the Agreement. There were many issues, both aesthetic and 
mechanical, that required extensive parts and labor to correct. An estimate prepared by 
Ken Martinez on January 12, 2008, indicates that the vehicle required more than 
$2,500.00 in body work. (R. at 134 iff 6-7; R. at 136; Ex. D.) 
13. At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues 
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive 
damage to the vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car 
sellable, the only commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the 
Collateral as salvage. At that point, Jordan had received no offers to purchase the vehicle. 
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Furthermore, Jordan's inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated that even if the 
necessary repairs were performed, the wholesale value of the vehicle would only be about 
$3,500.00. In Jordan's experience, sales after repossession generally only bring 
approximately wholesale value, or slightly less. (R. at 120, % 14; Ex. C.) 
14. After considering these factors, and after receiving no communication from 
Mr. Suniville, Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer it 
received, which was for $200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc.. Jordan sold the 
vehicle to Midvale All Small Auto on or about January 17, 2008. R. at 121, f 15; R. at 
152, f 5; see Ex. C and Ex. G attached hereto.) 
15. After the disposition of the Collateral, Jordan sent a letter to Mr. Suniville 
at his record address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after 
applying the sale proceeds to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus 
collection costs, attorney fees and interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of 
January 26, 2008. (R. at 121, f 16; Ex. C.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. MR. SUNIVILLE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require an appellant to 
marshal the evidence against him and meticulously demonstrate how the evidence does not 
support the factual findings of the trial court. Mr. Suniville did not marshal the evidence 
or show that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous and lacking in support. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED MR. SUNIVILLE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION. 
Although the trial court concluded that Mr. Suniville's memorandum in opposition 
was untimely, the court nevertheless considered all of the arguments and documents Mr. 
Suniville submitted, including Mr. Suniville's memorandum in opposition, as demonstrated 
in the court's Memorandum Decision and Order. The trial court properly ruled against 
Mr. Suniville after considering all of his documents and arguments. 
III. MR. SUNIVILLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTED COUNSEL 
NOR TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The trial court properly denied Mr. Suniville's request for appointment of an 
attorney, as a civil litigant has no right to court-appointed counsel. Furthermore, the trial 
court properly declined to stay the proceedings for over a year pending Mr. Suniville's 
release from prison. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND DISCOUNTED MR. 
SUNIVILLE'S INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Suniville failed to meet his burden under Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. None of the purported evidence he submitted to the trial court was admissible. 
The trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of Jordan Credit 
Union. 
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V. JORDAN WAS WITHIN ITS RIGHTS TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE 
FOLLOWING MR. SUNIVILLE'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION. 
Mr. Suniville defaulted under the terms of the Agreement between the parties 
because he lost possession of the vehicle as a result of his incarceration. Mr. Suniville 
further breached the Agreement by not keeping the vehicle in good condition or repair. 
Jordan was therefore within its contractual rights to repossess the vehicle. 
VI. JORDAN'S DISPOSITION OF THE VEHICLE WAS COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE. 
Jordan materially complied with the obligations imposed by the loan and security 
agreement as well as the Utah Commercial Code for disposition of repossessed collateral. 
Notice was properly given, despite a harmless error concerning Jordan's notice of the 
anticipated sale of the vehicle. The sale was to a third party in an arms length transaction, 
with no self dealing, in a manner recognized for this type of collateral. Thus, the sale was 
for commercially reasonable. 
VII. JORDAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Jordan is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to the 
Agreement between the parties, and in accordance with Utah law. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. MR. SUMVILLE HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Although, strictly speaking, the granting of summary judgment is a question of law, 
it is clear from Mr. Suniville's brief that he hotly contests the finding of facts that 
undergird the lower court's ruling. Specifically, Mr. Suniville wants to dispute whether 
the Court correctly accounted for the condition of the vehicle at the time Jordan sold it to 
the salvage yard. Mr. Suniville further attempts to dispute whether Jordan gave adequate 
notice of its intentions after it repossessed the car, and whether the sale of the car was 
commercially reasonable at all. The problem is that Mr. Suniville failed to put any 
admissible evidence in front of the trial court that might have created a dispute of material 
fact. Mr. Suniville now has a similar problem on appeal, in that he has failed to marshal 
the evidence, much less identify any fatal flaw in the lower court's reasoning. 
It is the duty of the appellant challenging a factual finding to marshal the evidence 
that supports the challenged finding. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); See also Wardley Better 
Homes and Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, if 14, 61 P.3d 1009. The appellant must 
then demonstrate that, even with this evidence, the findings of fact are clearly erroneous 
and lacking in support. Hill v. Estate of Alfred, 216 P.3d 929, 943 (Utah 2009). Mr. 
Suniville has failed to meet his obligation to show that the findings of the trial court were 
erroneous and that the grant of summary judgment was therefore against the great weight 
of the evidence. Consequently, the findings of fact (as set forth in the "Background" 
10 
section of the lower court's Memorandum Decision and Order) are presumed to be correct. 
See Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App 106, 1 31, 977 P.2d 1209. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED MR. SUNIVILLE'S 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION. 
Mr. Suniville suggests that the trial court improperly failed to consider his 
memorandum in opposition because the trial court believed that it was untimely. For the 
record, Jordan concedes that it received Mr. Suniville's memorandum in a timely fashion 
after filing its motion for summary judgment. For whatever reason, the memo in 
opposition was not filed with the court (or, at least it was not stamped in) until January 5, 
2009, approximately one month after Mr. Suniville mailed the memorandum to counsel 
for Jordan.1 (See R. at 175; See Ex. E.) 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the court concluded that the memorandum 
in opposition was untimely. (R. at 232; See Ex. A.) Nevertheless, the court went on to 
consider all of the arguments and documents that Mr. Suniville had submitted, just as the 
court said it would do during oral argument. (R. at 232-235; see Ex. A. See also R. at 
283, page 19, lines 22-23.) Those arguments included: (a) whether Mr. Suniville was 
current with his car payments; (b) whether Jordan had given adequate notice of the sale; 
*Not all of Mr. Suniville's opposing documents were filed on time, however. 
The unsigned affidavits of Ron Hinckley (Mr. Suniville's prison caseworker) and 
Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, together with a Notice Regarding Newr Evidence, 
were not filed until late February, 2009, nearly three months after Mr. Suniville sent 
his memorandum in opposition to counsel for Jordan, and well after his deadline to file 
a response to Jordan's motion for summary judgment. (See R. at 210 and 225.) 
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and (c) whether the vehicle was in working condition when it was repossessed. (R. at 233-
235; see Ex. A.) After considering all of that, the court concluded that Mr. Suniville's 
opposition was "substantively lacking" and ruled against him anyway.2 (Id.) The 
argument that the court failed to consider Mr. Suniville's memorandum is without merit. 
in . MR. SUNIVILLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO APPOINTED COUNSEL 
NOR TO STAY THE PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. Suniville next argues that the trial court should not have denied his request for 
appointed counsel or to stay of the proceedings until his release from prison, scheduled for 
March 23, 2010. (See Appellant's Brief, at 8.) Again, this argument is without merit. 
Mr. Suniville is not entitled to have counsel appointed for him in a civil matter. See State 
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 354 (Utah, 1993) ("We note that Defendant has no right to 
counsel in a civil case"). Furthermore, the court informed Mr. Suniville from the 
beginning of the case that choosing to represent himself would come with certain 
consequences and he chose to proceed on his own anyway. (See R. at 56.) That was his 
choice, and it is his problem. The court properly denied the motion to appoint counsel. 
2The trial court concluded that the evidence Mr. Suniville offered consisted of 
"hearsay, unsubstantiated opinions, and irrelevancies." (R. at 233; see Ex. A.) To 
illustrate, Mr. Suniville submitted: (1) the unsigned affidavit of his prison caseworker 
(R. at 210; see Ex. H.); (2) the affidavit of Shannon Weirick, who is the wife of a 
mechanic who had reportedly performed work on the car (R. at 225, see Ex. J); and (3) 
various other documents offered with no foundation or basis for admission (R. at 84-
101). 
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The court also correctly denied Mr. Suniville's request to stay the proceedings for 
over a year until he was released from prison. There was and remains no legal basis for 
his request to stay the proceedings. While Mr. Suniville's current housing situation is 
lamentable, it is nonetheless one of his own making. Allowing this matter to sit on the 
trial court's calendar for over a year would have resulted in undue delay and prejudice to 
Jordan Credit Union. Thus, the Court properly denied the request to stay the proceedings. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND DISCOUNTED MR. 
SUNIVILLE'S INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Suniville next argues that the court ignored "pivotal and key evidence." (See, 
e.g., Appellant's Brief, at 9.) This argument is without merit. Again, the court states in 
its Memorandum Decision and Order that it considered Mr. Suniville's submissions, 
generally, and specifically referred to the unsigned affidavit of Mr. Suniville's prison 
caseworker, who speculated that the car must have been functional when Mr. Suniville was 
arrested. (R. at 233-35; see Ex. A.) The problem is that none of Mr. Suniville's 
purported evidence was admissible. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure says: 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated 
therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest 
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upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response. 
(Emphasis added.) 
None of Mr. Suniville's purported evidence rose to the level of creating a dispute of 
material fact for the purposes of Rule 56(e). Not only did Mr. Suniville fail to submit 
signed affidavits, the purported testimony in the affidavits was speculative, contained 
hearsay, or was without foundation altogether. {See R. at 210, 225; see Ex's H and J.) 
Take for example, the Affidavit signed by Shannon Weirick.3 (R. at 225; Ex. J.) 
Ms. Weirick is the wife of the mechanic who allegedly worked on the vehicle a few 
months prior to its repossession. Ms. Weirick had no personal knowledge concerning the 
inspection of the vehicle. Hence, her testimony is inadmissible hearsay. (See Utah R. 
Evidence, Rules 802, 803, and 804.) The unsigned affidavit of Ron Hinckley also contains 
hearsay and opinion testimony concerning a portion of a report that he did not produce 
describing events to which he was not present. (R. at 210; Ex. H.) Finally, Mr. Suniville 
wanted the court to consider other documents, such as value and repair estimates, that 
were submitted without any hint of authentication or foundation, and were not attached to 
any sworn testimony at all. (See R. at 84-101, 220.) Mr. Suniville cannot ignore the 
basic, fundamental rules of evidence and civil procedure, and expect to create a dispute 
3The unsigned affidavit appears in its entirety in the Record at 225. The 
signature page, which is only signed by Mrs. Weirick, appears in the Record at 221. 
(See Ex. I.) 
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of material fact for the purposes of Rule 56 - much less prevail on any of his claims or 
defenses. More importantly, Mr. Suniville cannot accuse the lower court of ignoring 
pivotal and key evidence, when he did not put any admissible evidence before the court 
in the first place. 
V. JORDAN WAS WITHIN ITS RIGHTS TO REPOSSESS THE VEHICLE 
FOLLOWING MR. SUNIVILLE'S ARREST AND INCARCERATION. 
Next, Mr. Suniville essentially argues that Jordan breached the loan agreement by 
repossessing the vehicle at issue solely as a result of Mr. Suniville's incarceration. Again, 
Mr. Suniville is wrong. The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement, which 
Mr. Suniville signed on October 5, 2005, requires Mr. Suniville to keep the vehicle in his 
possession and in good condition and repair." (R. at 125-26, see "Ownership and Duties 
Toward Property", paragraph D; Ex. C.) He was also required to keep the vehicle at the 
address listed on page 1 of the Agreement, unless otherwise agreed in writing. (Id.) The 
Agreement goes on to say that Mr. Suniville will be in default if he fails to perform any 
obligation set forth in the Agreement, or Jordan believes in good faith that he cannot or 
will not perform his obligations. (Id., see "Default".) In the event of default, the 
Agreement gives Jordan the right to immediately repossess the vehicle. (Id., see 
"Remedies", paragraph D; Ex. C.) 
Mr. Suniville breached the Agreement when the vehicle was impounded as a result 
of his arrest for driving under the influence. (See R. at 128; Ex. C.) Because of these 
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events, the vehicle was no longer stored at Mr. Suniville's address, and he no longer had 
possession of the vehicle. Mr. Suniville further breached the Agreement by failing to keep 
the vehicle in good condition and repair. (See R. at 133-137; Ex. D.) Jordan was 
therefore within its contractual rights to repossess the vehicle. 
VI. JORDAN'S DISPOSITION OF THE VEHICLE WAS COMMERCIALLY 
REASONABLE. 
In addition, despite Mr. Suniville's arguments to the contrary, Jordan's subsequent 
sale of the vehicle was commercially reasonable, and was consistent with the requirements 
of the Uniform Commercial Code as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-601 et. seq. 
After default, a secured party is allowed to take possession of collateral securing a debt. 
(See U.C. A. § 70A-9a-609.) Following repossession the secured party may dispose of the 
collateral by commercially reasonable means. (See U.C. A. § 70A-9a-610.) If the sale is 
commercially reasonable, the "secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private 
proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place 
and on any terms." Id. Whether a sale is commercially reasonable depends upon whether 
the sale is made, "(1) in the usual manner on any recognized market, (2) at the price 
current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition, or (3) otherwise in 
conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property 
that was the subject of the disposition." (U.C.A. § 70A-9a-627(2).) 
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A pre-requisite to the disposition is notice to the debtor of the repossession and 
intended disposition of the collateral. (See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-611.) This notice must 
contain the information set forth in U.C.A. § 70A-9a-614. Then a creditor may dispose 
of the collateral and apply the proceeds of the sale first to the costs of sale and 
repossession, second to the loan balance owed to the creditor, and finally to any 
subordinate security interests. (See U.C.A. § 70A-9a-615.) The debtor is then entitled 
to proceeds in excess of the loan amount or is liable for any deficiency. Id. When 
disposing of collateral, the creditor has an obligation to secure the best possible price, but 
is under no obligation to use extraordinary means to obtain that price. Chrysler Dodge 
Country, U.S.A, Inc., v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 541 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Jordan notified Mr. Suniville of the repossession of the vehicle by way of a letter, 
dated December 11, 2007, that was sent to the address listed on the first page of the 
Agreement. (See R. at 125,130.) Having notified Mr. Suniville of the acceleration of the 
debt and that the car would be sold after December 20, 2007, if he had not paid the loan 
in full, and having received no communication from Mr. Suniville thereafter, Jordan 
proceeded to market the car for sale as is, but received no offers. (R. at 120, 11 11-12; 
Ex. C.) Jordan had the vehicle examined by a mechanic who determined that it required 
in excess of $2,500 in repairs. (R. at 120,1113-14; Ex. C. See also R. at 133-137; Ex. 
A.) Jordan decided that it would likely not recoup that expense in a later sale and elected 
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to sell the car for the best price it could get. (R. at 120, f 14; Ex. C.) Jordan was offered 
$200 and accepted the offer on January 17, 2008. (R. at 120, f 15; Ex. C.) 
Jordan's disposition of the vehicle was commercially reasonable under these 
circumstances, especially considering that the vehicle needed thousands of dollars of repair 
work. Requiring Jordan to expend thousands of dollars with no guarantee of recouping 
those funds, either through the sale or by adding them to the loan balance and seeking the 
deficiency, is an extreme measure that Jordan is not required to take under the Chrysler 
Dodge opinion. See Chrysler Dodge, at 541. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Suniville attempts to dispute elements of the sale, specifically that 
the notice letter Jordan sent to him on December 11, 2007, only gave nine days's notice 
of Jordan's intent to advertise the vehicle for sale, instead of ten days, as required by the 
Agreement. (See R. at 126, "Remedies," paragraph E; Ex. C.) It is true that the 
Agreement provides that a notice of disposition would be sent no less than 10 days prior 
to any intended sale. And Jordan concedes that the letter provided only nine days' notice. 
However, the trial court correctly held that this was a harmless error because even if the 
extra day had been given, it would not have mattered as Mr. Suniville was still 
incarcerated and would not have received it in any case. (R. at 234; Ex. A.) In addition, 
the actual sale did not take place until January 17, 2008, more than five weeks after the 
date of the letter. (R. at 120, f 15; Ex. C.) The lack of a Ml 10 day notice of the 
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intended sale was an immaterial breach, if a breach at all, and resulted in no harm to Mr. 
Suniville. 
Finally, Mr. Suniville repeatedly raises the issue of the blue book value of his car. 
Although valuation is not an element of determining the commercial reasonableness of a 
sale, both parties nevertheless introduced printouts from online vehicle evaluators as 
evidence of the value of the car at the time of the sale. (R. at 99-102 and 132; Ex. C.) 
Jordan introduced its valuation by way of a sworn affidavit, while Mr. Suniville did not. 
(R. at 118, 132; Ex's B and C.) Ignoring the admissibility issue, Mr. Suniville's valuation 
greatly overestimates the value of his car by using values that did not account for the 
damage to the car. The car was not in excellent condition, as Mr. Suniville would have 
the Court believe. Based on the descriptions in the condition ratings, the car was in fair 
condition, at best, if not poor condition, putting the value between $3,000 and $4,000. 
The battle of competing estimates is moot, however, because Jordan could not find a single 
buyer in the wholesale community, that was willing to purchase the car in its damaged 
state. (R. at 120, f 121; Ex. C.) Thus, the payment of $200 by the salvage yard is an 
accurate reflection of the fair market value of the vehicle. 
The trial court found that the diminished value of the car, together with the reduced 
sales prices at the auction and the extreme cost of making the car appealable to a buyer 
justified Jordan's decision to forgo the repairs and seek the best price it could get, as is. 
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Mr. Suniville produced no admissible facts to dispute this finding or to show that it was 
in error. This Court should do the same. 
VII. JORDAN IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
Jordan Credit Union hereby requests an award of the attorney's fees and costs it has 
incurred on appeal pursuant to the "Default" section of the written agreement between the 
parties, which says, in relevant part, "If you default, you agree to pay our costs for 
collecting amounts owing, including, without limitation, court costs, attorneys' fees, and 
fees for repossession, repair, storage and sale of the Property securing this Contract." (R. 
at 126, "Default"; Ex. C.) Utah follows the American rule regarding attorney fees, which 
dictates that fees are generally recoverable only if provided for by statute or contract. 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2008 UT App 22, f 9, 
177P.3d621. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed 
and Mr. Suniville's appeal denied. The Court should also award Jordan its attorney's fees 
and costs incurred on appeal, pursuant to the written agreement between the parties. 
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DATED this 4th day of November, 2009. 
TERRY JESSOP & BITNER 
Attorneys for Appellee Jordan Credit Union 
Christopher G. Jess< 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following at the address(es) indicated on the H*^  day of November, 2009. 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. CASE NO. 0S0qO3840 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Defendant. 
On November 21, 2008, Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union ("JCU") submitted its Motion 
for Summary Judgment. Defendant Harry Suniville filed an opposition and JCU responded. 
A hearing was held March 2, 2009, and the Court took the matter under advisement. The 
motion is now ready for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On October 5, 2005, Mr. Suniville signed a Retail Installment Contract and Security 
Agreement ("Contract") with JCU for the purchase of a car. Mr. Suniville borrowed 
$12,829.00 and agreed to make monthly payments, using the car as collateral. The 
Contract provided that Mr. Suniville would keep the car in his possession and in good 
condition and repair. It also provided that default would occur upon failure to perform a 
contractual obligation, or when JCU, "in good faith, believefs] that you cannot, or will not, 
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract." The Contract provided that 
upon default JCU could accelerate the entire debt, repossess the car, and initiate legal 
action to collect the amount left owing after the car is sold, plus collection costs, attorney 
fees, court costs, towing fees, repossession costs, repairs and storage costs. 
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On December 3, 2007, JCU was notified that Mr. Suniville's car had been 
impounded. JCU deemed this a default under the Contract and repossessed the car. On 
December 11,2007, JCU sent a letter to Mr. Suniville's address of record notifying him that 
it was repossessing the car, but that in the alternative Mr. Suniville could pay off the 
balance and impound fee by December 20, 2007 and retain the vehicle. Mr. Suniville did 
not respond within the given time period. 
JCU attempted to sell the car at auction but found no buyers. JCU's mechanic 
found that the car required about $2600.00 worth of repairs, excluding necessary engine 
work, but even then the car would likely sell for about $3500-$4000, yielding a slim, if any, 
profit. JCU opted for the less burdensome route and on January 23, 2008 sold the car to 
a junk yard for $200.00. JCU moves for summary judgment on its claims of breach of 
contract and unjust enrichment, requesting the Court to order Mr. Suniville to pay $8778.12 
in unpaid principal, plus impound fees, interest on the loan, and attorney fees and court 
costs. 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 7(c)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires an opposition to a motion to 
be filed within ten days of service of the motion. Mr. Suniville filed his objection on January 
5, 2009, over six weeks from the date JCU filed its motion. Mr. Suniville's opposition is 
untimely. The Court affords pro se litigants "'every consideration that may reasonably be 
indulged.'" Thompson v. Dep't of Corrections, 2007 UT App 97, *1 (unpublished) (quoting 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983)). Nevertheless, "[a] party who 
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge and practice as any 
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qualified member of the bar." In re Cannatella, 2006 UT App 89, U 5, 132 P.3d 684 
(citation omitted). Mr. Suniville's motions and oppositions filed with this Court lack proper 
titles, form and content, both procedural and substantive. 
Even if Mr. Suniville had filed a timely opposition, his objection is substantively 
lacking. He has not demonstrated an issue of material fact as required to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment. His submissions are based upon hearsay, unsubstantiated 
opinions, and irrelevancies. Mr. Suniville argues that he never missed a car payment, so 
he has not defaulted on the contract. However, JCU based its determination of default on 
the fact that the car had been in impound for a week before JCU was notified by the 
impound lot and that JCU did not receive any response to the letter it sent Mr. Suniville. 
That Mr. Suniville had diligently paid his monthly payments for over two years is irrelevant; 
JCU reasonably concluded that Mr. Suniville had defaulted under the terms of the contract 
Mr. Suniville argues that the $200.00 JCU recovered from the sale of the car was 
below its actual value and that JCU failed to mitigate damages. JCU complied with the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code in its reasonable attempt to sell the repossessed car. The 
statute allows a creditor to sell collateral in a "commercially reasonable manner," meaning: 
(a) in the usual manner on any recognized market; 
(b) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the 
disposition; or 
(c) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices 
among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the 
disposition. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). The Utah Court of Appeals held that the sale of a 
repossessed car is commercially reasonable if: (1) the lender does not engage in self-
dealing, (2) the debtor is given notice of the sale, and (3) the lender advertises the sale and 
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gets a fair price. Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 536, 539-42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, JCU sold the car to a junk yard, so it did not engage in self-
dealing. It also gave Mr. Suniville notice by letter that it was repossessing the car and 
would sell it unless Mr. Suniville paid off his loan within a given period of time. While JCU 
gave Mr. Suniville one day less than the 10 days notice required by the Agreement, the 
error was harmless because even if the letter had given Mr. Suniville another day, Mr. 
Suniville would not have received the letter in time because it went to his mother's house 
and he was incarcerated. As the court in Chrysler Dodge found in a similar fact-situation, 
"there is no evidence that [the creditor] was injured by lack of notice." Id. at 541. Lastly, 
JCU was required to sell the car through advertising and for a fair price. Id . The Utah 
Court of Appeals held: 
It is the duty of the secured party to obtain the best possible 
price for the benefit of the debtor. However, the secured party 
does not have to use extraordinary means. . . . There is no 
requirement or prohibition that the dealer must sell at 
wholesale or retail, but only that the secured party obtains the 
best possible price under the circumstances "Of prime 
importance, are the secured party's attempts to obtain a fair 
price for the collateral by advertising the collateral or otherwise 
notifying potential buyers that the collateral is for sale." . . . 
Public advertising is not mandatory, however. 
Id. at 541 (citations omitted). JCU attempted to sell the car at auction and got no bidders. 
It could have put a considerable amount of repairs into the car, but there was no guarantee 
that it would recoup its investment. Under the circumstances, JCU decided to cut its losses 
and get the $200.00. 
Mr. Suniville argues that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether the car 
was in running order at the time of impoundment on December 3, 2007. He submitted an 
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unsigned affidavit from his prison caseworker, who speculates that the car must have been 
functional since Mr. Suniville was arrested while driving the car. JCU's mechanic's sworn 
declaration stated that the car was not running. His testimony is based upon personal 
knowledge, unlike the conclusory statements submitted by Mr. Suniville. 
JCU was within its rights under the Contract to find Mr. Suniville in default. A court's 
determination of commercial reasonableness is to be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
See Chrysler Dodge, 782 P.2d. at 541. This Court has discretion to consider whether 
JCU's sale of the car was reasonable. JCU had previously attempted to sell the car at 
auction but had no bidders. The sale of the car for $200.00 was a fair attempt to mitigate 
damages. 
ORDER 
As required for a motion for summary judgment, the Court draws all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Employing these standards, 
the Court determines that Mr. Suniville has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material 
fact, and the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court GRANTS 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this [g day of April, 2009. / V A " ~ ' " * ' v V 
k^ufcC, 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
District Court Judge 
v ( 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 080903840 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 080903840 
Judge Kate Toomey 
Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), by and through the undersigned 
counsel of Corbridge, Baird & Christensen, hereby submits the following Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as follows: 
ARGUMENT RE: MOTION TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff requests that this renewed Motion to Dismiss be denied. Defendant previously 
filed a motion to dismiss on August 29, 2008. That motion was reviewed by this Court and was 
dismissed. The issue having already been reviewed and denied by this Court, Plaintiff asks the 
this renewed motion also be denied. This renewed motion raises no new issues or presents any 
new and relevant facts to be addressed and denial is proper. In addition, Plaintiff objects to the 
entirety of Defendant's motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists 
of nothing more than baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a 
single piece of relevant and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible 
evidence for the Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be 
denied. 
In the alternative, should the Court find merit in Defendant's position, Plaintiff requests 
that the Court also consider the facts and argument presented below in support of summary 
judgment in reviewing and ruling on the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs request is made on the 
grounds of judicial economy in that the facts and argument offered in support of and favoring 
summary judgment in this case also adequately and appropriately address Defendant's points and 
support denial of the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff believes it is prudent and an economical use of 
the Court's time to avoid unnecessary duplication by filing a separate response to the motion to 
dismiss. 
FACTS 
The following facts are established by the Complaint, attached documents and affidavits: 
1. On or about October 5, 2005, Defendant Harry Suniville executed a Retail 
Installment Contract and Security Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement") in connection with the 
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purchase of a 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse ("Collateral"), a copy of which is attached to the Affidavit 
of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference. (Affidavit of Michelle 
Rogers, f 4). 
2. Jordan has performed all of its obligations under the Agreement. (Affidavit of 
Michelle Rogers, 1 5). 
3. On or about December 3, 2007, Jordan received a notice from the Utah State Tax 
Commission that the Collateral had been impounded. A true and correct copy of this notice is 
attached to the Affidavit of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "B". (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 6). 
4. Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's 
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement. While the Collateral 
remained impounded, storage and impound fees were continuing to accrue and Plaintiff learned 
that the vehicle had extensive body damage and would not start. On the good faith belief that he 
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and 
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or 
about December 10, 2007. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers 1 7). 
5. Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation under the 
Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be 
performed, is considered a default. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 8 ; Exhibit A, Page 2, 
Section "Default"). 
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6. Defendant consented, by signing the Agreement, that upon default, he was liable 
to Plaintiff for all collection costs, including attorney fees, court costs, and fees for towing, 
repossession, repair, and storage. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 9 ; Exhibit A, Page 2, Section 
"Default"). 
7. Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several 
remedies listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any fees 
incurred and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount), repossession and sale 
of the collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts left owing after the sale. 
(Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 10; Exhibit A, Page 2, Section "Default"). 
8. On or about December 11, 2007, a letter was sent to Defendant at the address he 
provided to Jordan stating that the collateral had been repossessed due to the impound action. A 
true and correct copy of this letter is attached to the Affidavit of Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "C". 
This letter explained that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00 and had been 
added to the loan balance. The letter further stated that the debt had been accelerated and that 
Defendant needed to pay to Jordan on or before December 20, 2007 the entire loan balance, 
$9,312.37 and that failure to do so would result in Jordan selling the Collateral and that Defendant 
would be liable for any deficiency between the sale price and the loan balance. (Affidavit of 
Michelle Rogers, 1 11). 
9. When the deadline passed and Jordan had received no communication
 y from 
Defendant, the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, the usual and 
4 
customary procedure for the industry. Due to the damage and condition of the vehicle, there was 
no interest in purchasing the vehicle. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, ^ 12). 
10. In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the vehicle 
to a mechanic for inspection and evaluation. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 13). 
11. Through this inspection it was determined that the vehicle had not been kept in 
good condition and repair as required by the Agreement. There were many issues, both aesthetic 
and mechanical, that required extensive parts and labor to correct. A copy of the estimate of Ken 
Martinez dated January 12, 2008 indicates that the Collateral required more than $2,500.00 in 
body work. In addition, the engine also needed work as it would not start. (Declaration of Ken 
Martinez f f 6-7, Exhibit A). 
12. At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues related 
to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive damage to the 
vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car saleable, the only 
commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the Collateral as salvage. At that 
point no offers to purchase had been received and an inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated 
that even after the repairs wholesale value was only around $3,500.00 and sales after repossession 
generally only bring approximately wholesale value, or slightly less. Attached to the Affidavit of 
Michelle Rogers as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the current wholesale value of the 
Collateral. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 14). 
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13. After considering these factors and after receiving no communication from 
Defendant, Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer received, which 
was for $200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc., selling the vehicle on or about January 23, 
2008. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 15). 
14. After the disposition of the Collateral, a letter was sent to Defendant at his record 
address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after applying the sale proceeds 
to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus collection costs, attorney fees and 
interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of January 26, 2008. (Affidavit of Michelle 
Rogers, J 16). 
15. Demand for payment has been made and is hereby made upon Defendant for all 
sums due and owing pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, but Defendant has failed and refused 
to make payment. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, ^ 17). 
16. Jordan has been required to employ counsel in order to enforce the terms of the 
Agreement. Pursuant thereto, Defendant is responsible for all collection costs and legal expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Jordan in enforcing the Agreement. (Affidavit 
of Michelle Rogers, 1 18). 
17. Defendant Harry Suniville executed the Agreement as set forth in Jordan's First 
Cause of Action, and pursuant thereto received the use and benefit of funds. (Affidavit of 
Michelle Rogers, J 19). 
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18. Defendant has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to him 
without compensating Jordan, all to the detriment of Jordan. Defendant currently has the use and 
possession of those funds. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 20). 
19. The amount of unjust enrichment received by Defendant through January 26,2008, 
under the Agreement is the sum of $8,788.12, together with interest at the highest legal rate from 
January 26, 2008, until paid in full. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 21). 
20. Jordan has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to seek 
compensation for Jordan for the amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant. Jordan 
is entitled to an award of attorney fees. (Affidavit of Michelle Rogers, f 22). 
ARGUMENT 
I. JORDAN CREDIT UNION IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
FOR BREACH OF AGREEMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate in this case because there is no material dispute that 
Defendant breached the Agreement, that Plaintiff acted in conformity with the Agreement and the 
law in repossessing and selling the vehicle, or that Defendant remains obligated on the remaining 
loan balance. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment should be 
granted where there is no dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff in this case is entitled to summary judgment under this 
standard. 
The material facts in this case are undisputed. Defendant executed the Agreement with 
Plaintiff in which he promised to repay to Plaintiff the sum $12,829.00 plus interest in exchange 
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for Plaintiff loaning to Defendant a total of $12,829.00. As security for the loan, Defendant 
pledged the Collateral, purchased with the proceeds of loan. By signing the Agreement, 
Defendant also made several other promises, including that he would maintain possession of the 
Collateral at all times, keep the Collateral at his residence, maintain the vehicle in a condition of 
good repair, and to notify Plaintiff of any loss or damage. 
The Agreement further provided that any failure on the part of Defendant to fulfill these 
obligations would be considered a default of the Agreement, which default then permitted Plaintiff 
to exercise any or all of the agreed upon remedies. Those remedies included debt acceleration, 
repossession of the Collateral, power of sale to dispose of the Collateral in the event no payment 
is received, and to file legal action to collect any deficiency. Defendant also agreed*that he was 
responsible for any and all fees related to collection, repossession and disposition of the Collateral. 
The Agreement also provided that any notice required regarding the repossession or intended sale 
of the Collateral was deemed reasonable if mailed or delivered to the last known address on file 
with Plaintiff. 
There is no dispute that the Collateral was impounded, dispossessing Defendant of the 
Collateral. There is no dispute that the Collateral was damaged and not kept in good repair. In 
addition to the extensive body damage, there was an unidentified mechanical issue that prevented 
the vehicle from even starting. There can be no dispute, in good faith, that these facts constitute 
default under the Agreement. 
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Plaintiff had a good faith belief that Defendant would now be unable to meet his obligations 
under the Agreement. Because Defendant was in default, Plaintiff exercised its contractual and 
legal rights and repossessed the Collateral. Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff provided notice 
to Defendant of the repossession and acceleration of the debt, and his right to cure the default by 
paying all sums then due and owing. This notice was mailed to the only known address on file 
with Plaintiff, incidentally the very address provided by Defendant on the Agreement. 
A further default occurred after Plaintiff received no response from the Defendant, much 
less the full demanded payment. Defendant's prior pleadings evidence a grave misunderstanding 
of the nature of Plaintiff's causes of action. Plaintiff has claimed that Defendant failed to make 
the required payment. This claim is based on the fact that the debt was accelerated^by Plaintiff 
following default and pursuant to the Agreement. Defendant did not make that payment when due 
and Plaintiff then exercised its right to dispose of the collateral and seek the deficiency from the 
Defendant. Plaintiff understands now that Defendant was incarcerated at that time. However, 
Plaintiff had no knowledge at that time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many 
other cases in which debtor's simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their obligations. 
Defendant's incarceration was the result of his own choices, and should not be seen as a means 
of escaping liability for other obligations. 
Defendant has repeatedly inferred that Plaintiff had a duty to use every effort to track him 
down, assumably by calling throughout the phonebook and by searching the state's jails. By 
making this argument, Defendant fails to acknowledge that the duty to communicate was his. It 
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was his duty to care for the vehicle, to prevent its impound, and to understand the Agreement he 
signed. While his circumstances may be unfortunate, they are not to be seen as relieving him of 
his duties, especially when he made no effort to communicate them to Plaintiff. 
Defendant contractually agreed to be obligated on any deficiency, has defaulted on the 
Agreement multiple times, was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending 
action, and failed to cure the default as provided. Plaintiff recognizes that Defendant was 
incarcerated and is not unsympathetic, however, Plaintiff did all it was required or could be 
expected to do in this matter. Fairness and justice dictate that Defendant be made to honor his 
obligations. 
II. THE SALE OF THE COLLATERAL WAS COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE. 
In repossessing and disposing of the Collateral, Plaintiff was required to ensure the 
disposition was commercially reasonable. Plaintiffs sale of the repossessed vehicle was 
commercially reasonable under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (as codified in Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-9a et.seq.). Section 70A-9a-627(2) of the Utah Code Annotated reads as 
follows: 
. . . (2) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner 
if the disposition is made: (a) in the usual manner on any recognized market; (b) 
at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or (c) 
otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the 
type of property that was the subject of the disposition. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-627(2). In interpreting this section, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled 
that the sale of a repossessed vehicle was commercially reasonable where there was no self dealing 
on the part of the dealer/lender, reasonable notice of the sale was given to the debtor, and the 
vehicle was sold for a fair price. See Chrysler Dodge Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Curley, 782 P.2d 
536-542 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
In this case, there was no self-dealing. The vehicle was sold in an arms-length transaction 
to an uninterested third party. Notice was provided to Defendant of the repossession and that 
unless full payment of the accelerated debt was made by a certain date, the vehicle would be sold. 
This notice was provided to Defendant at the only address Plaintiff had been provided and the only 
address Plaintiff had knowledge of as a means of communicating with Defendant. 
Finally, the vehicle was sold for a fair price under the circumstances. Plaintiff initially 
attempted to sell the vehicle in the manner usual and customary among the financial institutions 
at public auction. These auctions typically result in a sale of the vehicle at or near the approximate 
wholesale value of the vehicle. The current wholesale price of the vehicle is between $3,200 and 
$4,400. Plaintiff had the Collateral inspected by an experienced mechanic who determined there 
to be at least $2,600.00 in damage, not including engine repairs. It would have been commercially 
unreasonable for Plaintiff to expend what was likely to be well in excess of $3,000.00 to make the 
Collateral saleable, increasing the total loan debt past $12,000.00 for a vehicle that in perfect 
condition would likely not have resulted in a sale for more than $3,500-$4,000. It was\ then 
commercially reasonable to sell the Collateral for salvage. The net effect of either avenue was 
11 
essentially the same, a deficiency of between $8,500 and $9,000. The condition of the vehicle 
upon repossession was the result of the Defendant alone and he alone bears the responsibility for 
the consequences of his actions. Plaintiff made every effort to mitigate its damages and in the end 
opted for the less burdensome route. 
Regardless of the disposition of the Collateral, Defendant was and remains obligated to 
repay to Plaintiff the loan. Defendant's promise to pay was unrelated to his continued possession 
of the vehicle. Plaintiff acted responsibly and in accordance with the law and the Agreement and 
should be granted judgment on its claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Because there is no material dispute as to any genuine issue of fact, and as a matter of law 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant, Plaintiff requests that judgment be granted in 
favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the amount of $8,788.12 as of January 26, 2008, plus 
interest at the contract rate of 5.5% per annum until paid in full, plus attorney's fees and costs. 
DATED this Z f day of November, 2008. 
CORBRIDGE, BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Douglas A. Oviatt 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on t h e ^ ' day of November, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss to: 
Harry F. Suniville 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
13 
EXHIBIT C 
Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, I AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE ROGERS 
v. 
Civil No. 080903840 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Judge Kate Toomey 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Michelle Rogers, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am employed by the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), as a 
Collection Officer. 
2. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein. 
3. I have personal knowledge of and am familiar with the Complaint on file herein. The 
allegations of Jordan Credit Union against the Defendant Harry Suniville are true. 
FILED Bismm cuum 
Third Judicial District 




4. On or about October 5, 2005, Defendant executed a Retail Installment Contract and 
Security Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and incorporated herein by reference. 
5. Jordan Credit Union has performed all of its obligations under the Agreements. 
6. On or about December 3, 2007, Jordan received a notice from the Utah State Tax 
Commission that the Collateral had been impounded. A true and correct copy of this notice is 
attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "B". 
7. Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's 
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement. While the Collateral 
remained impounded, storage and impound fees were continuing to accrue and Plaintiff learned 
that the vehicle had extensive body damage and would not start. On the good faith belief that he 
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan and to mitigate the damage and protect 
its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 
December 10,2007. 
8. Under the terms of the Agreement, any failure to perform any obligation under the 
Agreement, or the good faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be 
performed, is considered a default. 
9. Defendant consented, by signing the Agreement, that upon default, he was liable to 
Plaintiff for all collection costs, including attorney fees, court costs, and fees for towing, 
repossession, repair, and storage. 
10. Upon default, Plaintiff was permitted to avail itself of one or more of several remedies 
2 
listed in the Agreement. These included acceleration of the entire debt, pay any fees incurred 
and/or costs of repair (to be added to the principal debt amount), repossession and sale of the 
collateral, and initiate a legal action to collect on any amounts left owing after the sale. 
11. On or about December 11, 2007, a letter was sent to Defendant at the address he 
provided to Jordan stating that the collateral had been repossessed due to the impound action. A 
true and correct copy of this letter is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit "C". This letter explained 
that the costs of impound and repossession totaled $869.00 and had been added to the loan 
balance. The letter further stated that Defendant needed to pay to Jordan on or before December 
20,2007 the entire loan balance, $9,312.37 and that failure to do so would result in Jordan selling 
the Collateral and that Defendant would be liable for any deficiency between the sale price and the 
loan balance. 
12. When the deadline passed and Jordan had received no communication from Defendant, 
the Collateral was advertised for sale to the auto wholesale community, the usual and customary 
procedure for the industry. Due to the damage and condition of the vehicle, there was no interest 
in purchasing the vehicle. 
13. In response to the lack of interest due to the damage, Jordan delivered the vehicle to 
a mechanic for inspection and evaluation. 
14. At the time of the initial notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues related 
to the true condition of the vehicle were not known. After learning of the extensive damage to the 
vehicle and the great expense that would be required to make the car saleable, the only 
commercially reasonable option available to Jordan was to sell the Collateral as salvage. At that 
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point no offers to purchase had been received and an inquiry into the value of the vehicle indicated 
that even after the repairs wholesale value was only around $3,500.00 and sales after repossession 
generally bring less than book value, or slightly less. Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and 
correct copy of the current wholesale value of the vehicle. 
15. After considering these factors and after receiving no communication from Defendant, 
Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the only offer received, which was for 
$200.00 from Midvale All Small Auto, Inc., selling the vehicle on or about January 23, 2008. 
16. After the disposition of the Collateral, a letter was sent to Defendant at his record 
address informing him that the Collateral had been sold and that after applying the sale proceeds 
to his loan, the deficiency that remained was $8,778.12, plus collection costs, attorney fees and 
interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum accruing as of January 26, 2008. 
17. Demand for payment has been and is hereby made upon Defendant for all sums due 
and owing under the terms of the Agreement. Defendant has failed and refused to make payment. 
18. Jordan has been required to employ counsel in order to enforce the terms of the 
Agreement. Pursuant thereto, Defendant is responsible for all collection costs and legal expenses, 
including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Jordan in enforcing the Agreement. 
19. Defendant executed the Agreement as set forth in Jordan's First Cause of Action, 
and pursuant thereto received the use and benefit of funds. 
20. Defendant has had the use, benefit and possession of all the funds loaned to him 
without compensating Jordan, all to the detriment of Jordan. Defendant currently has the use and 
possession of those funds. 
4 
21. The amount of unjust enrichment received by Defendant under the Agreement, 
through January 26, 2008, is the sum of $8,788.12, together with interest at the highest legal rate 
from January 26, 2008, until paid in full. 
22. Jordan has been required to retain the services of an attorney in order to seek 
compensation for Jordan for the amount of unjust enrichment conferred upon Defendant. Jordan 
is entitled to an aware of attorney fees. 
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
DATED this Yb day of N0\| &lfY\liyy , 2008. 
lichelle Rogers ( j M
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this 
2008, by Michelle Rogers, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same. 
'iMUL^ 
Notary Public 
C \Documents and Settmgs\Michelle Rogers\Local Settings\Temp\motion for summary judgment wpd 
TRACEY JENSEN 
MVmmK'STmOFUTAH 
9260 SOUTH 3M EAST 
SANOY, UTAH 84070 
COttM. EXP. 01-15-2012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on thej^(/* day of November, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Michelle Rogers to: 
Harry F. Suniville 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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Exhibit "A 
RETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT 
ANO SECURITY AGREEMENT 
No 
Date i g /«5 /«5 
Seller 
ACCESS AUTO 
"Wo" and "us" mean the Seller above its 
successors and assigns 
Buyer 
SUXIYILLE HARRT 
2233 DALLIM ST 
SALT LWCS CITY, UT B4J49 
"You" and "your" mean each Buyer above and 
guarantor jointly and Individually 
SALE You agree to purchase from us on a time basis subject to the terms and condrtions of this contract and secunty agreement (Contract) the 







Lie No /Year 
• NewJ^] Used 
4A3*r$«»3E»17976 Other 
Description of 
Trade In Yllt 
SECURITY To secure your payment and performance undor the terms of this Contract you give us a security interest In the Vehicle all 
accessions attachments accessonos and equipment placed in or on the Vehicle together called Properly and proceeds of the Property 
You also assign to us and give us a security interest in proceeds and premium refunds of any insurance and service contracts purchased with 
his Contract 
PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS You promise to pay us the pnncipal amount of $ 12B29* W 
-harges accruing on the unpaid balance at the rate of 5»JJWL_ % per year from today s date until maturity Finance charges accrue on a 
plus finance 
 
A c t u a l 365 d a v basis After maturity or alter you default and we demand payment wo will earn finance charges on the unpaid 
balance at 3 , . 3 * * _ % per year You agree to pay this Contract according to the payment schedule and late charge provisions shown m 
he TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES YOJ also agree to pay any additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of this Contract 
3 ADDITIONAL FINANCE CHARGE You agreo to pay an additional finance charge of $ M/A that will be D paid In cash 
~) added to the Cash Price D pa d proportionally with each payment You agree that $ \IX of the prepa d finance charges 
vill be nonrefundable if you pay this Contract In full before the maturity date 
DOWN PAYMENT You also agree to pay or apply to the Cash Price on or before today s date any cash rebate and net trade »n value described 
n the ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED Q You agree to make deferred payments as part of the cash down payment as reflected in 
our Payment Schedule 
TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES 
ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE RATE 
The cost of your credit as 




The dollar amount the 
credit will cost you 
£_ 21M.52 
AMOUNT FINANCED 
The amoun! of credit 
provided to you or on 
your behalf 
c 12829. • • 
TOTAL OF PAYMENTS 
The amount you will have 
paid when you have made 
all scheduled payments. 
* 1433*. 52 
TOTAL SALE PRICE 
The total cost of your purchase on 
credit, including your down payment of 
$ */A 
$ H93E.52 
Payment Schedule Your payment schedule will be 
Number of Payments Amount of Payments When Payments Are Due 
£6 226.22 HOKTMLT aSBUUIM 11/19/63 
Secunty You are giving a security interest in the Motor Vehicle purchased 
££Late Charge 4< a payment is more than * days late you will be charged, . . 
3X of thm <J»lLpqt—«t awount or »3*T>6 do l l» r« , which fcvT La gr—t*r 
Prepayment If you pay off this Contract early you wiH not have to pay a penalty 
• If you pay off this Contract early you may be entitled to a refund of part of the Additional Finance Charge 
Contract Provisions You can see the terms of this Contract for any additional information about nonpayment default any required 
epayment belore the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties 
REDfT INSURANCE Credit life credit disability (accident and 
Balth) and any other insurance coverage quoted below are not jquirod to obtain credit and we will not provide them unless you sign 
nd agree to pay the additional premium If you want such insurance 
e will obtain it for you (if you qualify for coverage) Wo are quoting 
alow ONLY the coverages you nave chosen to purchase 
ITEMIZATION OF AMOMTRNANCETJ 
Vehicle Pnce (incl sales tax of $ 7 3 9 . — ) $ l22S3, 
Service Contract Paid to * $ 
Cash Frlce $ 
~~*7T 
redlt Life Insured 
D Single Q Joint Prem $_ 
redit Disability Injured. 
I/A ~nrr 
Manufacturer's Rebate $ 
Cash Down Payment $ 
Deferred Down Payment $ 
•/A 
~mr 
DSngle DJoint Prem $ , / A Term. ~trr 




our signature below means you want (only) tho insurance coverage(s) 
joted above If none are quoted you have declined any coverages we 
loroo 
Trade In Allowance $ 
Less Amount owmq $ 
Paid to (includes f) 
d Net Trade In (b minus c ) $ _ 
e Net Cash/Trade In (a plus d ) $ _ 
~H7I~ 
~i7ir 
uyer ri/o/b Buyer d/cvb 
J PROPERTY INSURANCE You must insure the Property securing 
iii> Contract You may purchase or provide the insurance through any 
sur ince company reason ibly acceptable to us Tl e collision coverage 
eductible may not txceed $ •'_* If you get insurance 
um or through us you wilt pay $ " ' * for 
l / A 




tiM> pu miurn s cumulated as follows 
J $ M/ i _ Deductible Collison Coverage S 
3 $ M * Deductible Comprehensive Cov $ _ • ' * 
J Fire- Hit ft and Combined Add tiorwl Coverage $ _ 
1 S -
lability insurance coverage for bodily Injury and motor 
ehlcle damage caused to others is not Included in this 
ontract unless checked and Indicated 
1 SINGLE INTEREST INSURANCE fou must purchase 
ngle interest insurance as pan of this sale transaction You may 
urchase tho coverage from a company of your choice reasonably 
cetipi ible to us If you buy the coverage from or through us you 
ill pu/ $ *'* for 
_ of coverago 
f Amount to Finance line e (if o is negative) 
Oown Payment (e disclose as $0 if negative) 
Unpaid Balance of Cash Price 
Paid to Puolic Official;. Filing Fees 
Insurance Premiums 







Total Other Charges/Amounts Pd to Others 
Less Prepaid Finance Charges 
Amount Financed 
'We may retain or receive a portion of this anwunt 
Tir» T«* 
J SERVICE CONTRACT With your purchase of the Vehicle 
HJ agree to purchase a Seiv co Contract to cover 
This Service Contract will be in 
NOTICE TO BUYER 
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if 
it contains any blank spaces (2) You are entitled to a 
completely filled In copy of this agreement (3) Under 
the law, you have the right to pay off In advance the 
full amount due and under certain conditions to 
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge 
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON 
PAGES 1 AND 2 OF THIS CONTRACT ANO ACKNOWLEDGES 
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT 
ASSIGNMENT This Contract and Secunty Agreement is assigned 
_ the Assign* e phone 
Th s assignment it, made f~j under the terms 
t a sopir ite agreement I ] under tho turms of It o A^SIGMMCNT 
IY SFl LhR o i page I f l This assignment it. m ide with rocoun>o 
Signature • J v 
t « / » 5 / « 3 
l * / « / W 
S gnature Date 
A U U i n U N A L I t H M ^ u r i n i o ^ u m i 
G E N E R A L T E R M S You have baon given the opportunity to 
purchase the Vehicle and described services /or the Cash Price or the 
Total Sale Price The Total Sale Price is the total pnce of the Vehicle 
and any services il you buy them over time You agreed to purchase 
the items over time The Total Sale Pnce shown In the TRUTH IN 
LENDING DISCLOSURES assumes that all payments will be made as 
scheduled The actual amount you will pay may be more or less 
depending on your payment record 
We do not intend to charge or collect and you do not agree to 
pay any finance charge or fee that is more than the maximum 
amount permitted lor this sale by state or federal law If you pay a 
f inance charge or fee that is contrary to this provision we will 
in&iead apply it first to reduce the principal balance and when the 
pnncipat has been paid in lull refund it to you 
You understand and agree that some payments to third parties as 
a part of this Contract may involve money retained by us or paid 
back to us as commissions or other remuneration 
If any section or provision of this Contract is not enforceable the 
other terms will remain part of this Contract 
B A L L O O N P A Y M E N T If any payment is more than twice as large 
as the average of all other regularly scheduled payments you may 
ref inance that payment when due You may do so on terms as 
favorable as tho terms originally agreed to in this Contract If you 
muel our normal credit standards This righl does not apply if your 
payment schedule is adjusted lor seasonal or irregular income or we 
do not olfer similar credit at that time 
P R E P A Y M E N T You may prepay this Contract In full or in part at 
any time Any partial prepayment will not excuse any later scheduled 
payments until you pay in full 
A refund of any prepaid unearned insurance premiums may be 
obtained from us or from the insurance company named in your 
policy or certificate of insurance 
OWNERSHIP AND DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY By giving us a 
security interest in the Property you represent and agree to the following 
A Our 5»erunty interest will not exlend to consumer goods unless 
you acquire rights to them within 10 days after we enter into this 
Contract or they are installed in or affixed to the Vehicle 
8 You will dofpnd our interests in the Property aqamsl claims made 
by anyone else You will do whatever is ntcpss lry lo keep our 
claim to the Property ahead of the claim ol anyone else 
( fhe secunty interest you are giving us in the Property comes, 
ahead of the claim of any other ol your general or secured 
creditors You agree to sign any additional documents or provide 
us with any additional information we may require to keep our 
claim to tho Property ahead of tho claim of anyone else You will 
not do anything to change our interest in the Property 
0 You will keep the Property in your possession in good condition 
and repair You will use the Property tnr its intended and lawlul 
purposes Unless otherwise agreed in writing the Property will 
be located at your address listed on paqe t ol this Contract 
E You will not attempt to soil the Property (unless it is properly 
identif ied inventory) or otherwise transfer any rights In the 
Property to anyone else without our prior written consent 
F You will pay all taxes and assessments on the Properly as they 
become due 
G You will notify us ol any loss or damage to the Property You will 
provide us reasonable access to the Property for the purpose of 
inspection Our entry and inspection must be accomplished 
lawfully and without breaching the peace 
D E F A U L T You will be in default on this Contract if any one of the 
following occurs (except as prohibited by law) 
A You fail to perform any obligation that you have undertaken in 
this Contract 
B Wo In good faith believe that you cannot or win not pay or 
perform the obligations you have agreed to in this Contract 
If you default you agree lo pay our costs tor collecting amounts 
owing including without limitation court costs attorneys fees and 
foes for repossession repair storage and sale ol the Property 
securing this Contract 
II an e v r n i of default occurs as to any one of you we may 
exercise our remedies against any or all of you 
R E M E D I E S It you are in default on this Contract we have all of the 
remedies provided by law and tins Contract 
A We may require you to immediately pay us subject to any 
refund required by law the remaining unpaid balance of the 
imount fmanc d finance c hiirges and all other ayreed charges 
8 We m i / pay f u r " " assessments or other hens or make ropairs 
lo ttu Propi rty il you havt not done so W P are not required to 
do so Any amount we p iy will be added to the amount you owe 
us and will be dm immodiaU ly Th s amount will earn finance 
charges from tho date paia if the post ma urity rale described 
in tho PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT TERMS section until 
p iid in lull 
C Wo may requm you to m*\kr the Property ivailabio to us at a 
placi w< dc stymie th it is i a ron ably convenient to you and is 
D We may unmi diately take po < * ion of me Property by legal 
process or sell In Ip bet m doing so WH uuy not breach the 
,H 1.1 e or unlawfully t titer onto youi pi onus* s We may th< n sell 
thf f roptV/ mo i pp l /wh i t wt> rerpivo is provided ) \ law to our 
reason ioU expc rises »nd tht n toward your obligations 
f Except wi { n piohil itod by iw wo may sue you for additional 
i o c v / U M M T M u n c c m c n i 
a ounts if the proceeds of a sale do not pay all of the amounts 
you owe us 
By choosing any one or more of these remedies we do not waive 
our nght to later use another remedy By deciding not to use any 
remedy we do not give up our nght to consider the event a default if 
It happens again 
You agree that if any notice Is required to be given to you of an 
intended sale or transfer of the Property notice is reasonable if 
mailed to your last known address as reflected in our records at 
least 10 days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such 
other period of time as is required by law) 
You agree that subject to your right to recover such property we 
may take possession of personal property left in or on the Property 
securing this Contract and lakon into possession as provided above 
I N S U R A N C E If required you agree to buy property Insurance on 
the Property protecting against loss and physical damage and subject 
to a max imum deduct ib le amount ind icated in the PROPERTY 
INSURANCE section or as we will otherwise require You will name 
us as loss payee on any such policy In the event of loss or damage to 
the Property we may require additional security or assurances of 
payment before we allow insurance proceeds to be used to repair or 
replace the Property You agree that if the insurance proceeds do not 
cover the amounts you still owe us you will pay the difference You 
may purchase or prov ide the insurance through any insurance 
company reasonably acceptable to us You will keep the insurance In 
full force and effect until this Contract Is paid in full 
If you fail to obtain or maintain this insurance or name us as a 
loss payee we may obtain insurance to protect our Interest »n the 
Property This insurance may Include coveragos not required of you 
This insurance may be written by a company other than one you 
would choose It may be written at a rate higher than a rato you could 
obtain if you purchased the property Insurance required by this 
Contract We will add the premium for this insurance to the amount 
you owe us Any amount we pay wil l be due immediate ly This 
amount will earn finance charges from the date paid at the post 
maturity rate riesenbed in the PROMISE TO PAY ANO PAYMENT 
TERMS section until paid in full 
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Each person who signs this 
Contr i c t agrees to pay this Contract accordinq to its terms Thu> 
means the following 
A You must pay this Contract even if someone else has also 
signed it 
B We may release any co buyer or guarantor and you will still be 
obligated to pay this Contract 
C Wo may release any secunty and you will still be obligated to 
pay this Contract 
D If we give up any of our rights it will not alfect your duty to pay 
this Contract 
E If we extend new credit or renew this Contract it will not affect 
your duty to pay this Contract 
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information is provided lo you separately 
WAIVER To the extent permitted by law, you agree to give up 
your rights to require us to do certain things W e are not 
required to (1) demand payment of amount* due, (2) give notice 
that amounts due have not been paid, or have not been paid in 
the appropriate amount, time or manner, or (3) give notice that 
we intend to make, or are making, this Contract Immediately due 
T H I R D P A R T Y A G R E E M E N T 
By signing below you agree to give us a security interest in the 
Property described in the SALE section You also agree to the 
terms of this Contract irtcluding the WAIVER sect ion above 
except that you will not be liable for the payments it requires Your 
in terest in the Proper ty may be used to sat is fy tho Buyer s 
obligation You agree that we may renew extend change this 
Contract or release any party or property without releasing you 
from this Contract We may take t f ^ s e steps without notice or 
demand upon you 
You acknowledge receipt of a completed copy of this Contract 
Signature Date 
NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT 
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OP GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR 
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY 
THE 0EBT0R SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE 
DEBTOR HEREUNDER 
IF YOU ARE BUYING A USED VEHICLE THE INFORMATION 
YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS 
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW 
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
A S S I G N M E N T BY S E L L E R 
Sullor soils and «., j r this Retail Inst III»M I t Conirict and rocunty Aijrfcmom (C unir ict) to the Assignoo Us successors and assigns Including all Its rights 
title and interest in this CorWncl and u y guarantee ttecutod MI connection wilh tins Oonlra i Seller gives Assignee fuH power etthof m its own name or in 
^Hpr"*- name to lake nil IIHJ.I1 nr o i tw ictions which Seller could havo taken undor this ( ontract (SEPARATE AGREhMCNT II tins Assignment Is made "under 
tt c leans of i snparate tyreeawnt *s indicated on paqe t tr* toims or thu asaig MIM nl >io dosci txid in a separate wnlmq(s) ai>d nol as provided below ) 
Soil* r w m wte 
A This Contract represent a j ilu tiy bt-iler lo Buyer on a tune price basis and i ot on a cash b isit, 
B l h i tin. i H is ( ontimod n this Contract j re true and correct 
C Tho down payment was nm Jo by the Buyer in tht manner slalod on page 1 ol It is Contr«t and except lor the application ol any m mufacturer s> rebate no 
part of tho down r> i>mont was lour ed or paid lo tho Buyer by Stllor or Seller's representatives 
D This sale wis completed m accordance with ull applicable, federal and slate law0 i nd regulations 
E This Conlr i d ^ v tlid ind enlorcn iblo n arcordanco w th its terms 
F The names and signatures on this Commit are not lorgod tctitious or assumed and are true and correct 
G This Contrai t is vested n the Sptlar free ol all lions is not subject to any claims ot dofonscs of the Buyer and tnay bo sold or assigned by tho Seller 
H A completely filled in copy of this Contr i d was delivered to the Buyer at the time of execution 
I Tho Vehk It has bt en d» liverod to tho Buyer in good condition ind has been accepted by Buyer 
J Alitor h is or will perfect a secunty interest in the Properly in favor of the Assignee 
If nny of these * wantias is brearhed or untrue Soller will upon Assignee s demand purch iso this Contracl from Assignee The purchase shall be in cash 
in the amount ol the unpaid halanco fincludmq finance charges) plus the costs and expenses ol Assignee including attorneys lees 
Seller w II mWmn fy A ^ g i re Inr my Inss sustained by it beeIUBO of judicial sot o<( or as tho result ol a recovery mads against Assignee as a result of a 
claim or delense Buyer h is against Soiler 
Seller w iivos nolicn of the aceppt inre ol this Assignment notice ol non payment or non podormanco and notice ol any other remedies available to 
Assignei 
As*i(jr ue n ay without noliee to Seller and w thout affecting the liability of Seller undor this Assiqnmont compound or release any nghls aqamsl and grant 
oxlonsions ol limn for payment to be made to Buyer and any other person obligated under ttus Contract 
UNLCSSOIHrHWloFlNOlCArLOONPAGF 1 1 MIS ASSIGNMENT IS WITHOU1 RECOURSE 
WI IM Rl COURSr If lhi Assiyn TH nt s mjtft w th NH oiir.n. us ir d e itud on p igc I A ^ qr ee t j k c fhio Ass«j<wrKMit w th certain rights ol recoui .o against 
Selle Seller aq eo hat il tl e Buy< i d' lauiu on iny ofoUqiton ol payment or port uminro under this Contract Seller will upon demand repurchase this 
f or UA( i fur it i irnntji t of the unoaid balance includnq finance cburyes due at that 11 x. 
Exhibit "B" 
Rtalf o l 'Uinh 
.ION M HUNTSMAN «1R 
Utah State Tax Commission 
PAM HKNDlUCtvSON 
(,'om wt', <.«tn ( Vt a*/ 
U RRtJf'KJOHNSON 
M?\RC K. JOHNSON 
frAlCCV WXoM ITONANRLU 
UODNUYti MARRGUJ liAKYU 11WUKRT 
#R WIGS FT 
# 1 0 5 b 10I>7 51ft 
l iu l . lJ I iu .U^JL. I I Iu l , .:1J(i]. 
JORDAN CREDIT UNXOM 
PO BOX 1888 
SANDY UT 84091-1888 
December 3 , 2,007 
NOTICE OF IMPOUNDED VEHICLE 
We recently received noUee from the law enforcement agency shown below that a vehicle registered in your name has been impounded. The 
information shown fusts iho vehicle, the date it was impounded, and the name of the impound yard where it is stored. If you no longer own thi 
vehicle, reply in wilting to the Division of Motor Vehicles, Please provide a copy of the bill of sale with your reply. 
Plate: 827UTR VIN: 4A3AC34G83Li017976 Year; 2003 Make: MITSUBISHI 
Report//: A1205Q47 Impound Date: 12/03/2007 Impound Reason: DUI 
Impound Agency; SALT LAKli COUNTY SHERIFF ~ UT0180000 
Impound Yard: GUtLLBRMO BLANCO TOWING 3790 S 150 E SOUTH SALT LAKE UT 84115-4770 (801) 759-2973 
To Obtain An Impound Release 
S«.»* 1 - Go to your local Motor Vehicle Office and present ownership documents and picture identification; and Pay, if due title and 
r! .ration foes mid $230 Administrative Impound Fee for DUI, tampering of or operation without Ignition Interloek System, or 
Exhibition Driving* 
Step 2 - Go to the impound yard and present Impound Relea.se issued by the Motor Vehicle ofliee; Pay the towing and storage fees. 
Failure To Claim Vehicle listed above within 30 days, may result in die sale of the vehicle at public auction. Utah Code Ann. §41-la-l 103. 
Effective May 5, 2003, the registered owner, lien holder, or owner's agent may be entitled to a refund of the DUI fee if the Driver's License 
Division did not take action against the driver under Utah Code Ann. §53-3-223 or §41-6-44,10. To obtain a refund of the DUI fee, the persi 
must submit a copy of the DDL letter lo die DMV wilhm 30 days of the date of the letter along with T0542, DUI refund request form. 
QU BSTIONS REGARDING THIS IMPOUND NOTICE may be directed to the Division of Motor Vehicles at (801) 297-7780 or 
1-800-368-8824 or fax (801) 297-3578, Criminal proceedings related to the impoundment of this vehicle are separate actions and aie not 
covered in this notice, nor by the Tax Commission. If you believe the Tax Commission has imposed incorrect fees or penalties, or has erred 
regarding the potential sale of this vehicle, you may appeal to die Division of Motor Vehicles as prescribed by Utah Code Ann, §59-1-501 a* 
§63-16b-3. However, the Tax Commission has no authority or jurisdiction over the towing and storage fees or the grounds for the 
impoundment. 
TO APPEAL TAX COMMISSION ACTION 
To Qle an appeal with the Tax Commission and TO protect your appeal rights, you must File a "Petition for Redetermination" wilhin 30 days ( 
Ihe mailing date of this notice, if a petition is not filed within the 30 dny period, the Tax Commission ha* no authority to consider your appc 
and this notice becomes ihe final determination. Attach a copy of this notice to your petition and return both to the Utah Slate Tax Commiss 
Division of Motor Vehicles, Attn: Special Services/Appeal at 210 N 1950 W, Salt Lake City, UT 84134. The Division of Motor Vehicles \ 
schedule a telephone-division confidence to answer questions and to discuss the issues widiin 30 days from the date we receive your peutior 
After the telephone-division conference, if you still disagree, yourpetilionmay be forwarded to the Appeals Division. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
Division of Motor Vehicles 
Special Seivices Ural 
" ^ i , i iMTifcY, Utah K1131 
Fax (M)l) V.H M-MM 
iv ww. t a*. nt ah«/;/JI • 
// you need ttti accommodation under thaAm^nanta with Pliabilities Act, contact ih? Tux Com mi 





CREDIT UNION Main Office: 9260 South 300 Hast, Sandy UT 84070-2917 
(801)567-3351 ore-mail: lonnhclp(<?jordan-cu.ojg, 
Dale: 12/11/2007 Re: Account // 58350-3 001 
HARRY 1'SUNIVIUJR 
2235 S DALLIN ST 
SAL r LAKE CITY, UT 84109-1118 
Dear HARRY PSUN1VILLE: 
On 12/10/2007, Jordan Cjcdii Union repossessed the 2003 MITSUBISHI used as collateral on the above 
loan. The repossession expenses incurred to date are $869,00. When added to the outstanding balance 
of $8,443.37, the amount owed to the credit union is $9312.37. If you want us to explain to you how we 
figured the amount you owe us you may call or write us. 
This does not include fees incurred from the repossession company of: $15,00 per day storage, and a 
minimum of $25.00 personal property fee. These fees are to be paid to die ^possession company (in the 
form of cash) upon delivery of said vehicle. 
Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in c«sh or cashier's check by 12/20/2007, the eiedit 
union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids. We will then sell the collateral to the highest 
appioved bidder. The credit union reserves the right to accept or reject any o\ all bids. You may not bid 
on the collateral; however, you may notify othei persons of the sale so that they may present bids, fn lhc 
evenl that an acceptable bid is not received, the credit union will sell the collateral in the manner it 
deems best. A sale may lake place at any time without further notice to you. If you need moie 
information about the sale you may write us or call us. 
hollowing the sale of the propeily, the sale proceeds will be applied to the costs of the sale, collection 
costs, accrued interest, and then to the outstanding principal If proceeds still remain, the balance will be 
delivered to you. If u deficiency remains, the credit union reserves the right to collect from imyonc 
obligated to pay* In the event that legal action is taken to recover this deficit, a judgement including 
attorney's fees- will be sought. Parties obligated to pay will be responsible for all fees/ charges incurred. 
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Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, I DECLARAI i < >N OF KEN MARTINEZ 
v. 
Civil No. 080903840 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Judge Kate Toomey 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Ken Martinez, state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of eighteen years (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth below. 
2. I am a certified mechanic and have worked in the automotive repair industry for 22 
years. 
3. I have been asked on several occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair 
services on vehicles repossessed by Jordan Credit Union. 
Third Judicial Q^tnC, 
NOV 2 1 2008 
/SALT LAKt u O i m l 
> Dornity (V 
4. On or about January 12, 2008,1 was asked by Jordan Credit Union to inspect a 
vehicle it had recently repossessed and to provide a repair estimate for the work that would be 
required. 
5. The vehicle I was asked to inspect was a 2002 or 2003 Mitsubishi Eclipse. 
6. I inspected the vehicle and found several problems that required work. These 
issues included body damage to the entire right side of the vehicle, both front headlight 
assemblies, passenger window broken, driver automatic window non-operating, broken tail 
light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition the vehicle would not start. 
7. I prepared an estimate, as requested, for the body work, parts and labor, required 
to repair the vehicle. This estimate was approximately $2,665.00 and did not inclucte any 
amount for diagnosis or repair of the obvious engine problem. A true and correct copy of this 
estimate is attached to this hereto as Exhibit "A". 
8. Jordan Credit Union declined to have the repairs made because the cost was greater 
than what the car would sell for at auction. 
I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT 
THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
EXECUTED on November jLZ—, 2008. 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the ^ 71 7V day of November, 2008, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Declaration of Ken Martinez to: 
Harry F. Suniville 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
I \3\3681\579\CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE-Declaration of Ken Martinez.wpd 
EXHIBIT E 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
PROSE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
FILED DISTRICT muwr 
Third Judicial District 
JAN . 5 200^ 
IT LAKE COUN1 i 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
vs. 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
MEMORANDUM AND REPLY 
(Submitted in SUPPORT OF 
Motion to Dismiss and Defendant's 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
[Original] COMPLAINT), AND AS AN 
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case # 080903840 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
Comes now before this Court, Hctrry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as the Defendant in 
the above-notated action, hereby submits this MEMORANDUM AND REPLY (In support of 
my preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs [Original] Complaint^ 
AND which is also hereby respectfully submitted in Opposition Response and Reply to 
Plaintiffs OPPOSING MEMORANDUM AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Here it may now be required or appropriate for me to point out that my MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, (the pleading that I 
filed with this Court November 4th, '08) is not, (as Plaintiff asserts,) really a "renewed" 
MOTION TO DISMISS, insomuch as it was the only argument (besides this one you now hold 
in your hand,) so far submitted by me in answer to Plaintiffs Original Complaint - since this 
Court set aside the Default Judgment against me in its MINUTE ENTRY dated October 8th, but 
allowing, nonetheless, an open window for Plaintiff to start the proceedings anew by mailing me 
a copy of their original Complaint, which I did not have, up until its receipt by me on October 
21, the benefit of having anytime ever before then received. 
Now, Plaintiff has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment, along with their 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and in 
Opposition to Defendant's (i Renewed" Motion to Dismiss [Henceforth referred to as Plaintiffs 
new Memorandum. ..] - And this is my Opposing Response and Reply to that. 
Quite frankly, I continue to be astounded at Plaintiffs impudence in continuing to pursue 
this lawsuit even after the egregious abuse and mistreatment of me as their used-to-be car loan 
customer is brought to light, and when their apology would seem, to me at least, to be the more 
deserved and appropriate response under these circumstances. 
Now replying to these newly-filed Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and In 
Opposition to Defendant's Renewed Motion to Dismiss, both of which were delivered to me at 
evening mail call on Tuesday night, November 25th, I will follow Plaintiffs example, in order to 
avoid unnecessary duplication and in consideration of a more economical use of the Court's 
time, by requesting that these facts and arguments offered herein in reply, and in support of and 
favoring my MOTION TO DISMISS, to also appropriately be considered as my address of, and 
my Opposition Response to, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, (along with its 
Supporting Memorandum). I believe these facts and arguments presented herein also, and 
accordingly - including some 25 material disputes as to genuine issue of fact - support a Court 
denial of said Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs Memorandum starts off by saying my Motion "raises no new issues or presents 
any new and relevant facts to be addressed . . . Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant's 
motion as hearsay and lacking any proper foundation. The motion consists of nothing more than 
baseless accusations and conclusions, none of which are supported by a single piece of relevant 
and admissible evidences. Because Defendant has provided no admissible evidence for the 
Court to consider in connection with his motion to dismiss, the same should be denied." (Pg. 2, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities) 
However, the Original Complaint filed against me was based entirely upon an alleged 
failure by me "to make payments when due pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement" (Their 
words: See #7, First Cause of Action); and in the Complaint's Second [and only othel"] "Cause 
of Action," (@ #14,) it is based upon the unfounded and redundant allegation that, "Defendant 
-has had the use, benefit and possession of all the iunds loaned to them [him?] without 
compensating Plaintiff.. ." Moreover, both the supposed "Breach of Contract," and "Unjust 
Enrichment," which are the First and Second (and only) Cause(s) of Action, as named in this 
Complaint, individually and collectively pivot upon this key point: an alleged failure of me to 
make my car payments [plural payments] on time. Accordingly then, in my Defendant 
MOTION TO DISMISS, I effectively showed, supported by notarized affidavit from U.S. Bank 
Private Client Group Vice President Michael Poulter, and other evidence(s) as well, that these 
Plaintiff allegations, which were the very foundation of their Complaint against me, was a 
foundation made of sand: that their case against me must necessarily fall, and fail, once the 
foundational basis crumble and is proven to be false - which it was. 
Now, it is almost laughable for Plaintiff to go backwards and try to clean it up, to switch 
up/change the foundational allegation by now saying (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, @pg. 
9,) "Defendant failed to make the required payment" [singular payment] and "This claim is 
based on the fact that the debt was accelerated by Plaintiff following default and pursuant to the 
Agreement." 
One has to interject the question, here directed to Plaintiff, how is a notarized affidavit 
from Jordan Credit Union Collection Officer Michelle Rogers any more credible than a notarized 
statement from my mothers' bank Vice President, and why, if my Motion and evidence really 
"raises no new issues or presents any new and relevant facts to be addressed," has it required you 
to change your entire story in pursuit of these bogus claims? 
Fortunately, I have faith that this Court will give impartial and even-handed consideration 
to the true facts of this case - will throw the lawsuit out of court if such is the appropriate relief 
and remedy when one party changes their whole story mid-stream, or submits pleadings and 
argument so transparently 'squirming' and disingenuous as has this Plaintiff Jordan Credit 
Union. 
Moreover, since this case at issue also pivots upon this loan contract here at issue, I 
would hope and pray for this Court to furthermore bear in mind the intrinsic 'Big Picture' here at 
stake. That it will reinforce my faith and belief in the fairness of Courts generally, by 
considering the precedent being set if a lender like Jordan Credit Union is allowed to just run 
rough-shod over the rights and legitimate property interests of those who choose to finance their 
purchase of a car. 
Please consider how you would feel, personally, to be so shabbily mistreated by a lender; 
and how nobody in his right mind would dare to finance a car if these kinds of lender behavior 
(as characterized by the words and actions of the Plaintiff themselves,) were the norm. 
Please consider that in big bold all capital letters near the bottom of the Loan Agreement 
and Contract are the words: "NOTICE: ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS 
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS AND SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF." Also, 
that even though I am, in my stumbling and awkward pro se ignorance, at a loss to know enough 
to specifically invoke what surely must be inherent Consumer Protections written into laws and 
regulations like Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, (Article 9, and elsewhere,) and in 
the Courts' precedent interpretations of same, to be used in my defense - that doesn't make these 
claims, protections and defenses any less real or relevant to this case at hand. Finally, I would 
hope and pray this Court to pay special attention to the Plaintiffs own words in their version of 
the foregoing events, and of Plaintiffs actions that their own words describe with this central 
question always in mind: were they acting like prudent and responsible business people when 
they made their decisions relevant to this case at hand, or could their preceding actions more 
properly be regarded, (and as I would certainly characterize them,) as arbitrary, capricious, hasty 
and reckless? 
Sometimes the truth, or more of it than a dissembling person would choose to tell, will 
inadvertently slip out; I believe Plaintiffs choice of words, (See newest Plaintiff Memorandum, 
[and version of events] @ Pg. 12,) "Plaintiff. . . in the end opted for the less burdensome route" 
is a poignant case-in-point because it is an unintended but succinct self-described summarization 
and revelation of Plaintiff s impetuous and callous disregard of me, and of my own inherent 
property rights in the car loan collateral/asset and vehicle (my car!) here at issue. They made 
absolutely zero effort at any step along the way to treat either me, or my/their collateral asset 
property, with any respect whatsoever on the assumption that I could be made to pay under the 
terms of this contract no matter how irresponsible and hasty, arbitrary and capricious, their own 
actions in regards to it. And that, in my humble opinion, surely constitutes the more egregious 
"Breach of Contract," by Plaintiffs to be herein considered. 
DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Once again, freshly stated anew, these are some of the disputed material facts in this case. 
In plain language, I strongly dispute Plaintiffs allegations regarding my car's condition. I 
believe and assert that my car was kept in reasonably good condition and repair for the 2+ years 
that I faithfully made my car payments on time to the Plaintiff. In Plaintiffs most recent 
rendition of their story, (their latest Memorandum of Points . . . ) they allege it was not, and they 
attempt to partially explain their decision to repossess my car from off the impound lot where it 
was being temporarily stored as being based on this disputed allegation that it, (my car) was not 
kept in good condition. Interestingly, Plaintiff in their own latest Memorandum of Points, can be 
seen to contradict themselves: 
"At the time of the initial [only] notice of repossession sent to Defendant, the issues 
related to the true condition of the vehicle were not known." [Emphasis added] (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points.. . Pg. 5 @ \ 12; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f 14). Remember, 
this notice of repossession mailed to my mother's house - the only notice they ever bothered to 
send anywhere, and not received by me until January 17th, the day I got out of jail - was dated 
12/11/07, and it informed me, (See Exhibit C, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers,) "On 
12/10/2007, Jordan Credit Union repossessed the 2003 Mitsubishi used as collateral on the above 
loan." 
However, these statements of theirs are contradicted elsewhere, (See Plaintiff 
Memorandum of Points. . . Pg. 3 @ |4 ; and Affidavit of Michelle Rogers @ f7) where they 
allege, "While the Collateral remained impounded.. . Plaintiff learned that the vehicle had 
extensive body damage and would not start. [Emphasis added] On the good faith belief that he 
would be unable to make the required payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and 
protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or 
about December 10, 2007." 
2. What's more, I dispute both parts of this allegation (extensive body damage and 
would not start) regarding my car's true condition of maintenance and repair. And, I assert that 
it can only remain an undisputed material fact - one that directly contradicts Plaintiff allegations 
- that this car was running just fine right up until the traffic stop by S.L. County Sheriffs that 
resulted in my arrest and the impound of my vehicle. This begs the question: Where does this 
falsely alleged and non-existent, so-called "engine problem" come from? 
Were I not so handicapped of resources like unlimited phone calls, or access to legal self-
help and law books that many people not presently incarcerated might tend to take for granted -
particularly were I not so pressured by time restraints in keeping to Court-filing deadlines - there 
are several relevant issues come immediately to mind as screaming for more extensive scrutiny 
by means of discovery. 
3. First, I have previously stated, in my first Defendant response to this original 
Complaint (my Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant's Answer to Plaintiffs [original] Complaint,) 
that there were some admittedly then-pending body damage repairs that needed to be made on 
my car when it was impounded. I also provided this Court an Exhibit C, therein, which was a 
previously obtained formal Estimate for all of these needed repairs, dated October 9, 2007, from 
Mirror Image Body and Paint. It is where get all of my body damage repairs made - both 
previously on this very same car in question, and on cars that I have owned before this one -
especially my 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse that I sold when I upgraded to this newer 2003 now at 
issue. I go to them because they, (owners Dick and his wife Shannon, who over time have also 
become my friends,) do first-class, excellent showroom quality work at a fraction of the cost 
some other body shops might charge for the same amount of work. As an example, when my 
previous car, (before this one at issue, the 1997 Mitsubishi Eclipse,) was "run over" by a large 
semi-truck, crushing a corner of its roof, in turn shattering the front windshield and drivers' side 
window, with extensive door and quarter panel damage, too, the first estimate for body damage 
repairs I obtained was in excess of $4400.00, the second one came in closer to $4800.00, and 
then my very expert auto mechanic (Lynn's Auto, Murray, where all my cars get very expertly 
mechanically-maintained,) recommended I take it to Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint: and 
there it was fixed for 'good as new' at a cost of only $1500.00 (approximately). We 
subsequently hung before-and-after photos of my car, and of their extremely professional repairs, 
on their office wall to advertise for future, quality-seeking customers! 
4. Now consider this Plaintiff-submitted "Declaration" of Ken Martinez whose name and 
business appear nowhere on any on-line directory, in any capacity as an auto repair business (at 
least none that my prison caseworker could find when he 'surfed' Google and Dex, and other 
directories looking,) and whose credentials are stated to be, "I have been asked on several 
occasions to perform inspection, estimation and repair services on vehicles repossessed by 
Jordan Credit Union." In this "Declaration" he further asserts, "8. Jordan Credit Union declined 
to have the repairs made because the cost was greater than what the car would sell for at 
auction." Doesn't such a statement seem just a little contrived, and coached, and self-serving, 
coming as it does from a "several occasions" in the past mechanic for a financial institution like 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union? - particularly if the sale of a $9,000.00 car for only $200.00 was 
really an "arms-length" transaction, as Plaintiff alleges? 
5. When I contacted the salvage yard owner who ended up buying my 2003 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse in my efforts to try and reverse the outrageously ludicrous transaction whereby my 
$9,000.00 Kelly Blue Book-valued car had been sold to him for only $200.00, he refused, not 
surprisingly; and, he asked me to provide him a key for my car because the necessary computer-
chip key, (with codes available only from Mitsubishi: my car had a keyless entry and ignition 
lock system which made duplicate keys very hard to come by, or at least expensive, since by 
personal experience, key duplication cost in excess of $125.00,) - that is, the only key then 
existing, had stayed in my pocket when I was taken to jail. And this, of course, in turn then begs 
the question: what was Ken Martinez using for a key when he was determining my car "would 
not start"? Too, does this help to explain all his confusion about windows supposedly broken? 
6. Moreover, I question, and I dispute, altogether, and most firmly, many more aspects of 
this "Declaration's" assertions as well because I believe it is a deliberate exaggeration and 
distortion of the true condition of my car now belatedly, and at second-hand, alleged by Plaintiff 
solely to strengthen their bogus claims in this matter. 
Next consider this: in his so-called inspection and estimation of repair services, this self-
described "mechanic" [notice: not auto body mechanic] identified my car as a "2002 Mitsubishi 
Eclipse"- and with the model year wrong, (mine was a 2003,) how can he possibly, and 
accurately price replacement parts? 
7. Additionally, there was nothing at all wrong with either headlight assembly, though 
his greatly exaggerated Estimate lists them both as needing replacement at a cost of $265.00 
apiece. His same estimate invoice says a Passenger Window was broken, and a taillight, and that 
a right front tire was "flat." Now, if the car had truly lacked both headlights, and a taillight, 
doesn't it seem likely that the Sheriff who cited me for not having an "Ignition Interlock 
Device," (which I never have been required to have on any car of mine, and who also cited me 
for DUI even though my breathalyzer testing at the time of arrest showed 0.00, and blood testing 
at the scene of arrest also resulted in 0.00 blood toxicology,) - would then overlook such basic 
vehicle equipment violations as these would be? 
8. Now turning back to his written testimony, (See "Declaration", @ 6) he states "body 
damage to the entire right side of the vehicle," in addition to both front headlight assemblies, 
passenger window broken,... broken tail light, flat tire, and missing gas cap. In addition, the 
vehicle would not start." (I ask again, what ignition key was he using?) And, here, different 
from the written and itemized Estimate, (See Attachment to his written "Declaration(s)") my 
"driver automatic window" also turns up to be allegedly, "non-operating," and yet, it is the 
Driver Door Glass which he says needs replacement on the left side, bottom, of his formal 
Estimate of Repairs - and it is the Passenger Window broken on the right side of his itemized 
Estimate of Repairs! With window replacements priced at $420.00 this is not an insignificant 
discrepancy, and he has told three differing accounts on only two pieces of paper! Moreover, 
when I last saw my car, no window was broken, and my Exhibit from the Impound Tow Truck 
driver will prove this to be so. 
9. Furthermore, on this "Declaration's" attached itemized Estimate of Repairs, note that 
the gas lid is listed at a replacement cost of $45.00! Additionally, that the alleged replacement 
cost of a bumper support is listed at $95.00: Yet, Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint would tell 
you that we had already replaced the front bumper support preparatory to the complete, then-
pending (at the time of repossession) body shop repairs that would have rendered my car 
cosmetically to a "good as new" state of repair. 
10. In November/October of '07, the Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint formal estimate 
of pending repairs (and which I previously submitted to this Court in my most recent pleadings 
as an Exhibit C,) priced all of my then-pending and needed repairs at $511.81 - and these 
included repairs to the front fiberglass bumper, which we 'jerry-rig' and temporarily repaired by 
tying down the old, broken one to the newly-installed bumper support, with arrangements then 
made for a new front bumper cover (already paid for in advance, early October) and that was part 
of the final and complete repairs which we at that time put on hold for the remaining $500.00, 
(earmarked from my Christmas money,) to be paid. Then, and that way, everything needing the 
slightest bit of attention to keep this prized sports car of mine a 'hot' car could all be painted at 
once. Hence, and in short, this temporary, 'jerry rig' repair of the broken front bumper - tied to 
the newly-installed bumper support, so that all adjacent parts could be held in place securely, not 
to rattle around, possibly fall off- could not have been made at all except that the bumper 
support that Ken Martinez has alleged was needed was already installed and in place. 
Here, I suppose I have raised questions by herein admitting that there were, in fact, some 
automotive body shop repairs then pending for this car here in question and that it would have 
been "less burdensome" or more convenient to ignore altogether. Except that I have faith that 
even a simple man telling the simple truth can prevail in our Courts if the unvarnished truth of 
things supports such a verdict. In life, sometimes the truth can be messy, maybe inconvenient, or 
at least complicated. Too, as I write this, I am also now remembering that some of these then-
pending auto body repair charges were being deferred and juggled against other expenses, and 
these other expenses, necessarily put first, included the annual licensing and registration, 
complete with complete safety and emission testing that always has been due on this particular 
car of mine before the end of October. Certainly, anybody who has ever owned a car will 
appreciate the fact that car maintenance is usually a 'work in progress.' I still have a full set of 
service receipts and records on this car which would prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that all 
routine and preventative mechanical maintenance and repairs were always made on time for as 
long as I had this car under contract of the Loan Agreement. Similarly, when this credit union 
lender first asked me to ensure that the full insurance which I have always carried on this cat* -
including comprehensive and collision insurance coverage - was renegotiated with my insurance 
carrier to include a higher-priced policy of less deductible on the comprehensive and collision 
insurance parts of my coverage package, I readily and promptly attended to that responsibility of 
mine, also. 
Still, because the cost of all the then-pending body damage repairs on my car were less 
than the deductible, it remained for me to do this as I could afford to, ie. with Christmas money 
from my mother. It was by far the more prudent and economical of choices regarding same for 
these repairs to the front end (requiring a new fiberglass bumper cover @ $235.00,) and to the 
passenger side front-fender panel (@ $125.00 as itemized by Ken Martinez; $175.00 @ Mirror 
Image Auto Body and Paint,) because it is far easier and better to paint everything all at once, 
besides being less intrusive to the car's normal, day-to-day usage. 
One other consideration also played into this minimal delay of mine in getting everything 
fixed for good as new, with my car restored to an excellent, almost 'mint' condition of 
maintenance and repair with Christmas money, and that was the circumstances of my apartment 
complex neighbor, next door to me in Apartment 4, having made October arrangements with me 
to compensate me in $50.00 installments out of his weekly paychecks as a means of paying for 
the approximate $250.00 in damages to my right front fender when his drunken and uninsured 
girlfriend hit my car with her own when sloppily parking her car in the stall immediately 
adjacent to my #5 apartment parking stall. I agreed to this arrangement - in the interest of 
neighbor relations - not to file an insurance claim because these repairs were only half the 
amount of my deductible, and thus would have represented an out-of-pocket expense anyway, 
(given her uninsured status,) figuring that $250.00 in installments was better than nothing 
coming from her non-existent insurance coverage. They were a purely cosmetic dent damage 
anyway, a dent that did not affect in any way my headlight, nor my wheel. 
I apologize to this Court for all these many words: but at least they have the virtue of 
being unvarnished truth, even if somewhat complicated to explain - and with the advantage that 
every aspect of these circumstances surrounding the roughly $500.00 then pending to complete 
all repairs can be completely confirmed and verified by all these other persons, and facts, 
involved. 
11. Since obviously, taking all of these facts and circumstances and arguments of mine 
into consideration, into account, there remains a lot of controverted material facts relative to 
Plaintiffs allegation that my car was in terrible condition when they arbitrarily decided to 
repossess it - particularly since, depending upon which version of their story one chooses to 
believe regarding my car's true and actual condition, its condition after impound is being used as 
a justification for their capricious decision to accelerate the loan payments and to repossess this 
loan collateral. Perhaps even more importantly, the true condition of my car has a very direct 
bearing on my own argument that they failed miserably to mitigate their alleged collateral 
deficiency damages by selling my car - the collateral asset - for a mere pittance of its real and 
true, actual value. 
12. Because this is a core issue at the heart of this case, I inquire of the Court, "What 
would it take to depose these 2 witnesses from "Ken Martinez" and from Mirror Image Body and 
Paint, respectively? To depose other witnesses I might call in my defense to set the record 
straight regarding my prized sports car service and maintenance records, or the neighbors and 
friends who would not hesitate to confirm my story that this car (regardless some relatively 
minor and pending, purely cosmetic repairs to the front bumper and passenger-side (right) front 
fender,) was always kept in a reasonably good condition and state of repair? How can I, without 
Court extensions of filing deadlines, introduce into the record photographs of my car to lend 
better credence to these assertions of mine, and to my side of these very substantial, and 
significant, disputed material facts? 
13. Meanwhile, I wish to now introduce into the record my Exhibit A, Attached -
which is the Vehicle Impound Report issued by Guillermo Blanco Towing at the date and time of 
my arrest and the subsequent decision by S.L. County Sheriff to impound my car. (Please Note 
that with all or nearly all of my Exhibits herein, including this one here at hand, and previously 
too, I am sending the Original and not a copy, to this Court.) This Vehicle Impound Report, 
issued by the arresting officer and Guillermo Blanco Towing necessarily addresses the condition 
of the vehicle being impounded with some small thoroughness, lest the owner of the vehicle 
when coming to the impound lot to reclaim the vehicle try to blame them for pre-existing 
damages. This, very sadly for me, turns out to be the last time I ever saw my car, (though I had 
already been hauled off in handcuffs before this Report was ever written,) - and that's because 
Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union interjected themselves between myself and Blanco Towing by 
maliciously and capriciously repossessing my car from off the Blanco Towing Impound Lot. 
And, a close examination directly contradicts the greatly exaggerated claims of damage alleged 
by Plaintiff to this car at issue. 
Nowhere does this Vehicle Impound Report's list of pre-existing damages list, for 
example, broken windows, flat tires, missing gas lids, nor broken headlights, broken taillights -
all of which the itemized Estimate and "Declaration" submitted by Plaintiff - now obviously 
fraudulently - does allege! Furthermore, when one compares the reported odometer reading 
between this Vehicle Impound Report and the Itemized Estimate submitted by Plaintiff, it would 
appear either he or the repossession company drove my "non-starting" car an additional 40 
miles! 
14. Given all of these contradictions that are clearly evident throughout Plaintiffs 
contentions that my car was not kept in an overall and reasonably good condition of repair, as I 
believe, and testify that it was, their contention that $2665.00 would be required to fix my car, 
not including engine repairs (as declared by their affidavits), or "well in excess of $3,000.00 to 
make the car saleable," (See new Plaintiff Memorandum of Points.. . @ Pg. 11) there probably 
exists right here, alone, grounds adequate enough — if not to throw their case out of Court in its 
entirety - then to at least dismiss their Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of all these 
disputed material facts? 
II. PLAINTIFF IS IN BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Plaintiff is in Breach of Contract: both the 'letter' of the Loan Contract Agreement has been 
violated by them, along with and as well as its 'spirit'. 
15. I dispute "reasonable notice," as Plaintiff has asserted. Plaintiffs new Memorandum 
of Points... places much of the emphasis and focus of their arguments upon the Loan Contract 
Agreement that I signed at the time I purchased my car, and a copy of said Contract is submitted 
by them as an Exhibit A, Attached to Affidavit of Michelle Rogers. Then they have repeatedly 
asserted that I "was given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action." 
(See new Plaintiff Memorandum, @ pg. 10; also as a so-called Fact #8 @ Pg. 4; and in Michelle 
Rogers' Affidavit @ #11, also.) 
Yet, the letter that they sent to me at my mother's house on December 11th, (See 
Plaintiff Exhibit C, Attached to Michelle Rogers' Affidavit) and which they freely admit was 
their only outgoing attempt at any kind of communication with me throughout the course of this 
entire fiasco, very clearly says, "Unless $9312.37 is delivered to the credit union in cash or 
cashier's check by 12/20/07, the credit union will advertise the collateral for sale and solicit bids. 
We will then sell the collateral to the highest approved bidder.. . A sale may take place at any 
time without further notice to you. If you need more information about the sale you may write 
us or call us." Finally, from the last paragraph of their letter, "Personal belongings must be 
claimed by 12/02/2007, or they will be disposed of." This last is a pretty telling representation of 
the 'sloppy' work that characterizes Plaintiffs arbitrary and capricious, reckless, hasty and 
arrogant, most of all incompetent, actions for every step of the way henceforth forward - the sale 
of my car, particularly. 
But, anyway, back to the heart of this argument: By far more importantly, turn now 
back to the Loan Contract in question (See my highlighted Exhibit B, Attached). "You agree 
that if any notice is required to be given to you of an intended sale or transfer of the Property, 
notice is reasonable if mailed to your last known address, as reflected in our records, at least 10 
days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such other period of time as is required 
by law)." Because 12/11 is 9, not 10 days' notice before the intended sale of 12/20/07, Plaintiff 
is clearly in default of their own obligations to this 'two-way street' Contractual Agreement! 
And thus contradicting their very own alleged material facts re. Reasonable notice by the very 
evidence they have themselves provided! Very clearly, "Reasonable Notice" never was provided 
in this case at issue. 
16. Perhaps even more importantly and central to my primary argument, they have 
themselves also breached the essential spirit of this Contract, as well as its letter. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit B, submitted in their newest pleadings, is the Notice of Impounded 
Vehicle sent to Jordan Credit Union as the title holder of my car by the Utah State Tax 
Commission advising them that my car was impounded to Blanco Towing's Impound Yard. 
Note that the only thing 'scary' or irreversible about this notice is the advisement that towing and 
daily storage fees will be required to get the car out of impound, and that "Failure to claim 
vehicle listed above within 30 days may result in the sale of the vehicle at public auction," and 
dated December 3rd. Presumably this letter triggered all of Plaintiff s behavior that followed. 
According to Michelle Rogers, (See her Affidavit @ *|[7; also, Plaintiffs newest Memorandum, 
Pg. 3 @ Tf4) "Because the Collateral had been impounded and was no longer in Defendant's 
possession, Defendant was in default under the terms of the Agreement." 
The Contract Agreement does have a provision that says "You will keep the Property in 
your possession in good condition and repair . . . Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the 
Property will be located at your address. . ." But, it also says, "By choosing any one or more of 
these remedies, we do not waive our right to later use another remedy. By deciding not to use 
any remedy, we do not give up our right to consider the event a default if it happens again." 
[Emphasis added] In other words, lender, (in this case Plaintiff Jordan Credit Union,) reserves 
the right always to make subjective judgment regarding same, and exercise these rights to default 
and to the full extent of the law and this contract, //the situation seems to call for such dire 
measures, seems to present a problem that places in jeopardy the lender's security interest in the 
collateral (car) purchased with the proceeds of the car loan they elected to accept. 
People financing a car enter into these kinds of agreements with their eyes open (one 
would assume or hope), certainly: For example, everyone knows that if they fail in their primary 
and most important obligation - namely, their agreement to make all of their agreed-upon car 
payments on time, they will very soon afterward lose the car. Similarly, that the lender's 
security interest in the vehicle collateral must be protected at all times - meaning full insurance 
to the lender's complete satisfaction, and the car commensurately and also kept in good 
condition and repair - or again, they should not be surprised to soon lose their car to repossession 
if they fail in these primary obligations and responsibilities to the lender. 
However, and nonetheless, the Contract is a two-way street, and the borrower, as the 
registered owner of the vehicle in question has his own vested property rights and interests at 
stake in his purchase of it, and thus is surely entitled to reasonable assurance and expectations 
that the lender will accordingly respect his own property rights, and treat him fairly and in 
accordance with, and in harmony with, reasonable and responsible, acceptable and established 
standards of normal business lender behavior - not willy-nilly considering him in default at the 
slightest deviation from the 'fine print', surely. In other words, provided he has met all of his 
most important obligations to the lender, the registered owner of the vehicle is surely entitled to 
just a little leeway with regards to where he parks his vehicle: different from his home if he's 
sleeping over at a girlfriend's house, or on vacation out of town, for example. Provided he has 
insurance policy coverage on the vehicle that allows it, (and no jeopardy to the lender,) perhaps 
he's not constantly and technically "in possession" of the vehicle at all times because some other 
licensed driver has been given permission to drive his car; or as another example, perhaps he's 
not constantly and technically "in possession" if the car's been left overnight at the service 
mechanic's shop. . . Yet, despite these small 'fine print' deviations from the "in possession" 
clause, is there any reasonable-thinking person who would really and truly consider him to be "in 
default" of the car loan contract? And, certainly, if his important obligation to keep his car in 
reasonably good condition of maintenance and repair has been met, if all the important 
mechanical maintenance, preventative maintenance, upkeep and repair has been satisfied, and 
evidences diligent care and concern for the legitimate property interests of the lender,"then "in 
good faith" nearly everyone would have an unstated understanding that inevitably sometimes a 
needed repair is on pending status while waiting for parts, money, time enough, etc. and surely 
that person is not then "in default" if his car has been allowed to go unwashed, say - or in my 
case, if pending cosmetic repairs have been temporarily postponed until all the money to make a 
pending repair had become available. (Remember, my car had just finished passing safety and 
emissions testing that were required for the car's annual registration and licensing obligations, 
and that were renewed for another year by State of Utah's October Renewal) 
These are only common-sense exceptions to the rule - but in retrospect, common sense 
has become to seem a very rare commodity in Plaintiffs 'scheme of things' because they have 
used the term "good faith" to mean "we can do anything we want - regardless the vested rights 
and interests of the car loan customer." In Plaintiffs vernacular, the term "good faith" has 
become an oxymoron because they use this term to justify the most arrogant, disrespectful, and 
malicious of behaviors on their own part - and if I ever hear the term from them again, rest 
assured, I'll be holding on to my wallet. Without reservation, I adamantly dispute the so-called 
material "facts" as alleged by them whenever and wherever they have used the term in their 
explanations for all that herein follows the triggering event, which was the car's impound and 
temporary storage at the tow yard. 
Plaintiff tells us, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . ^ [4, Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit @ \l) "On the good faith belief that he would be unable to make the required s 
payments on the loan, and to mitigate the damage and protect its interest in the Collateral, Jordan 
repossessed the Collateral from the impound lot on or about 12/10/07." 
And, (@ Plaintiffs newest Memorandum... f 5, Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ [^8,) "on the good 
faith belief by the lender that an obligation would not or could not be performed is considered a 
default." . . .Except as prohibited by law. [Emphasis added]. 
18. It is not very hard to see that this was a very large assumption {presumption, more 
like,) for them to be making on the basis of so little information. It is also yet one more of their 
so-called "material facts" that I vigorously dispute because on the basis of these flimsy 
presumptions, Plaintiff accelerated the loan's entire outstanding, unpaid balance; and then they 
repossessed my car right out from under me - from my rightful partial ownership, established by 
2+ years of monthly car payments already paid to them, on time, like clockwork, each and every 
month - when they just up and decided, (without one iota of attempted communication with me: 
their December 11th letter, and the only notice they ever even bothered to send, reported my car's 
repossession as a 'done deal' and an accomplished fact; and by then, my car had already been 
repossessed when they mailed this letter to me,) to take it from me and from off the impound lot 
where it was temporarily stored! I believe this decision made by them was entirely impetuous 
and imprudent, as well as malicious, arbitrary, and capricious - coming at me as it did without 
the slightest attempt, or courtesy whatsoever, to try and talk to me first, seemingly with zero 
regards for the uncontroverted fact that I had been for them, up until the impound and their 
subsequent decision to repossess, an entirely trouble-free, steady and reliable with my on-time, 
every-time car loan payments, kind of car loan customer. Talking to me first, or through my 
family, would most certainly have put all their collateral security-based cares and concerns (read 
after-the-fact excuses, more like,) to rest. 
19. I mean, Does it really seem to be prudent business decision-making at work when 
they stoop to say, (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum. . . @ Pg. 9) "Plaintiff had no 
knowledge at that the time that Defendant's situation was any different from the many other 
cases in which debtor's [debtors] simply defaulted and attempted to walk away from their 
obligations." ? This after 2+ years of making every single one of my car loan payments on time? 
20. Plaintiffs weak, feeble, and ineffectual efforts to communicate with me were 
ineffective and not at all reasonable given that they surely must have by then known where these 
monthly car payments were coming to them from: ie. my mother's bank (U.S. Bank Private 
Client Group). Moreover, there are (and always have been) 2 Salt Lake City telephone directory 
phone book listings for Suniville; both are family members, and both would have immediately 
intervened to protect both mine, and the Plaintiffs interests in my car, if only the problem had 
been in any way communicated to anybody. 
With such momentous news as this to communicate, their single Notice of Repossession 
letter, dated December 11th - and which was their only effort to communicate with me in any 
way whatsoever - sent as a Certified, Return Receipt Requested Mail, or even as a telegram, 
would have been far more reasonable. Obviously, even a delinquent car loan customer would 
have received more and/or different mail than did I. 
Moreover, the Impound Notice mailed to them as the title holder by the Utah State Tax 
Commission made it evident, as well very likely, that I was in Salt Lake County Jail - put there 
by the S.L. County Sheriffs Office (the same as my car was impounded,) as a result of an arrest 
for DUI. One single telephone call to the jail would have confirmed this. It would also, by far, 
have saved everyone concerned a great deal of trouble because I, or my family acting in my 
behalf, would have immediately taken steps to protect my car from such dire and unexpected 
response precipitated by Jordan Credit Union. My point bears repeating, I think: even a 
delinquent customer, behind on his car loan payments, would have received more notice than 
was sent to me. 
Plaintiff has tried to argue that it was I who had a "duty to communicate," that I was 
given proper and reasonable notice of the default and the pending action (which is itself 
predicated on false presumptions, and hardly a reasonable amount of notice, clearly contradicted 
even by the terms, and requirements of the Loan Contract Agreement itself, (and as I have 
already shown to be clearly defined therein.) Then, Also: that, "After receiving no 
communication from Defendant," (Please see Plaintiffs newest Memorandum.. . @ Pg. 6, f 13, 
Michelle Rogers' Affidavit @ fl5) "Jordan sought offers from salvage yards and accepted the 
only offer received which was for $200.00"! How could I possibly be expected to remedy 
what I didn't know was happening? Please consider: I might just as easily been on an 
extended vacation out of town and inaccessible to the reach of ordinary mail. Isn't it far more 
"reasonable" an expectation that before entering into a transaction that obviously represented 
such a "bath" and egregious loss for them, as well as for me, that in the interests of pure common 
sense, as well as prudent business practices, they might have tried just a little harder to contact 
me first? Wouldn't this have been, by their own words, the by far "less burdensome route"? . . . 
if only to explore the potentiality by at least somehow attempting to assure themselves that 
their single letter had actually been received? 
Quite easily, I could have refinanced the accelerated loan balance with some other 
financial institution, (and been done with Jordan Credit Union once and for all,) for the out-of-
pocket additional expense of repossession (stated to be $869.00, according to the one, only, 
Notice of Repossession, which was ineffectually mailed to me after the repossession had become 
accomplished fact) - and which presumably, mostly, represents the charges incurred at Blanco 
Towing which I was intending and prepared to pay anyway. 
Reversing or reconsidering the default decision might have kept me in the loan with 
payments of $226.00 paid to them monthly for a long time afterwards (according to the terms of 
our Loan Contract Agreement.) So isn't it logical then, to at least wonder why they made not the 
slightest effort to somehow at least explore the barest possibility of that before they next 
proceeded to just flush all of mind and their collateral asset straight down the drain by accepting 
a single, one time payment of only $200.00? 
In fact, every other decision and action taken by Jordan Credit Union in response, and 
which, step by step, in turn precipitated all these problems that followed, seems rushed, hasty, 
and ill-considered, (as well as mean-spirited, malicious even) but mostly, reckless, capricious 
and arbitrary. . . One almost has to wonder whether they already had a pre-conceived agenda 
they were putting into momentum - almost as though they hoped that I wouldn't step up to 
salvage the loan and save my car? 
21. So here I must now ask this Court another critical question: How can a deposition be 
arranged to be taken from whichever Jordan Credit Union loan officer was in charge of my car 
loan when all these preceding and critical decisions were being made? Plaintiff has introduced 
into the record an Affidavit from Michelle Rogers - but was it actually she who was in charge of 
these reckless decisions at the time? Here is why I am starting to speculate and wonder about the 
worst: 
In an earlier pleading to this Court, I once stated that every time Plaintiff Jordan Credit 
Union has filed a new piece of paper, I learn something new about my car. In Plaintiffs newest 
Memorandum. . ., it is stated that my car was "sold for $200.00 to Midvale All Small Auto, Inc. 
on January 23rd, '08. Plaintiff mailed this Court an Exhibit A on September 18th that was 
attached to the Memorandum in Opposition (before this Court's Decision and Minute Entry that 
set the default judgment aside.) It was a notarized record of S.L. County Jail Records, and it 
shows that I was first released from jail, (following the December 3r arrest that resulted in the 
temporary impound of my car,) on January 17, '08. My own Verizon cellular phone records 
confirm and verify what I also remember: that from my very first communication with Jordan 
Credit Union, (talking to someone whose name I do not exactly remember, except that it was the 
person I was told that I must talk to because she was in charge of my loan account, and car - 1 
wrote it all down, of course, but I do not have those notes with me here,) always, from the very 
first conversation, the sale of my car was being reported as a 'done deal' and accomplished fact. 
I remember asking her incredulously, "You sold my $9,000.00 car to a salvage yard for 
$200.00!" "Yes," she answered, "it had some front end damage and we couldn't get the car to 
start."... Incredible! 
But here's my point, which is a huge question: Out of jail, which was not until about 5pm 
on January 17th, which was a Thursday, too late to call anybody then, I began my calls to ail-
importantly retrieve my car, on the following morning, Friday, 1/18/08 - and I was told that the 
girl I needed to talk to at Jordan Credit Union was unavailable to talk with me until that 
following Monday, which would have been January 21, '08. Now learning that the sale of my 
car did not take place, according to Plaintiffs newest Memorandum..., until January 23rd, then I 
was either being lied to when I talked to her, or she avoided all of my telephone calls for three 
days while she made the final arrangements that sold my car for a mere pittance of its actual, real 
and true value! 
Apparently there is a law already in place that is meant to ensure that the sale of a 
repossessed vehicle does not involve any self-dealing (by proxy, or otherwise, presumably.) 
Given the very fishy smell emanating from this transaction, especially in light of my own 
inquiries being stalled and/or avoided for 3 long days before - by Plaintiffs own admission -
this sale had been finalized, completed on January 23rd, I think it would be very interesting 
indeed to get both these parties in Court, or before a Deposition Hearing? . . . 
22. So, here again, I most vehemently dispute everything about the so-called material 
"facts," as characterized and alleged by this Plaintiff, regarding both the "reasonable" and 
adequate Notice provided me, the customer, by Plaintiff- along with nearly everything else 
about the sale of my car by them, and which I, in turn, must instead characterize as arbitrary and 
capricious, especially hasty and recklessly impetuous, as well as mean-spirited and malicious, or 
worse... There was no adequate or reasonable Notice provided me, nor was this car of mine 
sold for a fair price. 
23. I have already shown how, by far, the best price Plaintiff could have received for the 
collateral asset would have been simply to have left me in it - kept the loan alive, and thereby 
received every last penny as we originally contracted between us by the terms of the Contractual 
Loan Agreement. It would appear they very arrogantly and cavalierly assumed (presumed) that 
my mother's bank would compensate them for the entire amount of any collateral deficiency 
owing, regardless how reckless and impetuous their own failure to mitigate the collateral 
deficiency damages. It would appear they just didn't care, in their rush to find the "less 
burdensome" route. Unfortunately for them, neither my mother nor my bank has the slightest 
obligation, nor inclination, to continue to help me pay for a car I no longer have. Sadly, I have 
been sent to prison ten times over the last twenty-two years, and haven't a single valuable or 
worthwhile asset to my name, nor do I have any marketable job skills or prospects, either. Still, 
if this Court should decide not to rule in my favor, it will be a shame for my credit to have been 
fruitlessly ruined by the egregiously remiss and unfair treatment of me by this Plaintiff... and 
for the bad precedents being set, to the detriment of everyone else behind me who might be 
considering to finance a car - particularly from this Plaintiff whose bad behavior would then 
have been encouraged, rewarded and protected, no matter that they have demonstrated a callous 
indolence and disregard for my own rights and reasonable expectations in this matter. 
24. It is my contention that Plaintiffs Notice of Repossession, dated 12/11/07 - which 
was their only attempt at communication with me - and which said, (see Plaintiffs Exhibit C) 
UA sale may take place at any time without further notice to you. If you need more information 
about the sale you may write us or call us," was a most inadequate notice which not only violates 
the Loan Contract itself, (and as I have already shown, my pg. X, herein,) which required 10, not 
9 days notice between December 11th and December 20th; it also seem to fall far short of the 
'reasonable notice of the sale5 required to be given to the debtor, as proscribed by law. 
25. Neither was Plaintiffs decision to sell my/their collateral asset, (my car!,) to a 
salvage yard for a mere pittance of its real, true and actual value a "commercially reasonable" 
decision. Just now please consider that when the original Loan Agreement and Contract was 
made and accepted by this Plaintiff (October 2005,) my car's retail value was accepted to be 
worth $11,500.00 which was the amount of the loan, zero down payment required, (the amount 
financed being $12,829.00 after fees and sales tax were added on.) This car was also accepted to 
be, at that time, an adequate collateral sufficiently enough to meet their own security in the 
amount loaned to me. 
Now, only 25 months later, (25 monthly payments later,) they 'stretch and scramble' to 
make the sale of this collateral seem more reasonable in their arguments, by purporting that its 
value had sunk to a mere (See Plaintiffs new Memorandum... @ Pg. 11) "wholesale price of 
the vehicle . . . between $3200.00 and $4400.00" However, this is a wholesale Trade-In value 
and it is one year more dated (Kelly Blue Book, 10/28/2008) than when they actually sold my 
car for $200.00, as evidenced by their self-serving Exhibit 'D' (attached to Michelle Rogers' 
Affidavit) which, being a year different, newer, of course places less valuation on my car than it 
was worth in December, 2007. 
26. Even still, their own submitted math is wrong, becoming yet one more disputed so-
called material "facts" in this case. First, and primarily because, as I have already shown, their 
allegation that my car needed $2600.00 for enormously inflated and exaggerated costs of repair, 
additional to an undiagnosed engine problem, and as declared by Ken Martinez, lacks credibility, 
(to say it kindly.) 
Moreover, even if this Court were accepting of that testimony despite its contradiction of 
record by both Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint, AND by the tow and impound receipt 
showing no broken windows, headlights, taillights, etc. . . the math is still wrong insomuch as 
$4400.00 (disputed) less greatly exaggerated costs of repairs @ $2600.00 (also disputed,) leaves 
a collateral asset amount of $1800.00, not $200.00. Furthermore, what prudent and responsible 
business person would ever loan at retail, and sell for wholesale? Other credit unions sometimes 
park their repossessed automobiles outside the business with FOR SALE signs in the window, 
presumably to best recoup their money in loans gone bad, ie. when a loan customer fails to make 
his promised payments. Jordan Credit Union seems not to care about any of that: it was far 
easier for them to hastily sell my car willy-nilly for any old price so long as it was quick and 
easy, "less burdensome," and because they figured I could be made to pay for their improvident 
mistakes, no matter how badly they behaved. As such, for egregious and cavalier FAILURE TO 
MITIGATE THEIR DAMAGES, one might almost regard this resulting collateral deficiency as 
their just and deserved 'rewards'. Most certainly, this disposition of collateral has not been made 
"in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers," and as Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code proscribes. As the Utah Court of Appeals has previously ruled, the 
vehicle must be sold for a "fair price," (sans self-dealing.) 
CONCLUSION 
Had I been left in charge of my own car, I'd have sole it for its true worth, retail to a 
private buyer, and had money left over after paying off my loan completely, like as not - and this 
more closely approximates what any "reasonable commercial practices among dealers" would 
similarly dictate under these circumstances. Not the "less burdensome" route? Less burdensome 
would have been to take a few extra minutes to try and communicate to me, Plaintiffs steady 
and reliable customer for over 2 years. It was also a courtesy that I had every right to expect. 
They loaned for $12,000.00, then sold for $200.00: no wonder they lost money and there's a 
collateral deficiency let over once the smoke from their rash and hasty, arrogant and arbitrary 
caprices clears the air. Accordingly, I pray for this Court's relief from these bogus and unjust 
claims. And, I additionally argue that I should myself be compensated from out of the pockets of 
this Plaintiff who, (in their original Complaint, and in their vehement argument against their 
previously obtained judgment by default against me, too - a judgment obtained for exactly 
double the amount they now are more modestly alleging their collateral deficiency to be? I 
hereby seek compensation for the full 2 months car loan payments accepted by them after they 
already had repossessed my car, and also for a fair and modest $250.00 replacement costs borne 
by me when all of my personal property inside the vehicle turned up missing, and for^ any other 
punitive cost relief and damages which this Court feels it appropriate to award me. Thank You 
for these considerations. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (Memorandum and 
Reply In Support of My Preceding Motion to Dismiss, and Defendant Answer to Plaintiffs 
[Original] Complaint, AND as an OPPOSITION RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, 
PREPAID MAIL on the date specified, for Case #080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry, and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
DATED THIS ^ day alfec&olkf , 2008. 
Harry E/Suniville, Jr., PRO SE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
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A U U I i iurNf\i_ i c n m s u r m i n 
u N t R A L T E R M S >ou have -boon q i \ en (fie opportunity tu 
ich U L the Vehicle Jiid do .cubed SPP/ICCS for tho G J h Puce or IN* 
lai ">ilc Purr T) r Tonl Sale Pnrc is 11K tut il price ol thn VBIIICIO 
d any seiviv.es if )QU bu> tliem over time ^ou ugrcod to purrhise 
» items over tirno The Total Sufc Price shown In the TRUTH IN 
NOING DISCLOSURES assumus that all payments wiH be mode as 
heduksd Tin. actual amount you will pay may be more or less 
pending on your paymont record 
We do not intend to charge or collect and you do not agree to 
y any finance charge or loo that is more than ttie maximum 
icunt permitted for this sale by state 01 federal law H you pay a 
ance charge or fee that is contrary to this provision we will 
lead apply it fust to reduce trio principal balance and when the 
ncipal has been paid in full refund it to you 
You understand and agree thdt some payments to third parties ns 
pari of t h r Contract may involve money retained by us or paid 
ck lo us HS commissions or othei remuneration 
If any soctinn or provision of this Contract is not enforceable the 
ler terms will remain part of this Contract 
\ L L O O N P A Y M E N T If any payment is more than twice as large 
the average of all other regul.irly schodulcd payments you may 
irmncn t h i t payment when due You may do so on terms as 
rorable as the terms ongmally agreed to en this Contract ff you 
•et our normal credit standards This right does not apply if your 
yment scln dule is adjusted for seasoml or irregular income or we 
no! offer similar credit at that limp 
R E P A Y M E N T You may prepay flits Contract In lull or in part at 
y time Any p irtial prepayment will not excuse any Idtar scheduled 
yments until you p ly in lull 
A n fund uf nny prep »»<1 unearned msuumra prorrMums may be 
tamed I tom us or from th<» insurance company named in youi 
lic> or cei t i t ic i t t of insuiance 
rfVNERSHIP AND DUTIES T O W A R D PROPERTY Oy giving us a 
nurity hteiBst in the Property you reprrsnnl and agree to the lollowmg 
A Our spr unty interest wilj nol extend lo consumer goods unless 
you acquire rights to thorn within 10 d lys after we onler into this 
Cnptr ict or the v are mot jlled <r CM dllmed «o the Vchitti. 
B You will UHtiRiOur i n l e r c L in mc Property aqainsl ci i ims nwdr 
by "anyone BISP YOU will du whatever u t eei ss in, to keep uui 
claim lo tho Property IJIQ-KJ of the claim of anyonp pise 
C l"he secunty inlc rnsi you ara qiving us in the P openy comes 
ahead of the claim ol any other ol your o c n o n l or secured 
ci editors N ou agree lo sign nny additioml docurnerts or provide 
us with inv additional information we rna/ require to keen) our 
claim lo Iho Properly attend of tho claim of anyone c'se You will 
not do anything to chango our Interest in the Property 
D You will keep the Property in your possussion in good condition 
and repair You will use the Property for its intended and lawful 
purposts Unless othwwtse agreed in writing the Property will 
be located al your address listed on paqs I ol this Contract 
E You will not attempt lo sell the Properly (unless tt is properly 
tdontif iod inventory) or otherwise transfer any rights in tho 
Property to anyone else without our prior vuitten consent 
F You will pay all taxes and assessments on the Properly as they 
become due 
G You will notify us ol uny loss or damage to the Property You will 
provide us reasonable access to tho Property lor the purpose ol 
inspection Our entry und inspection must be accomplished 
lawfully and without breaching the peace 
E F A U L T You will be in default on this Contract if any one of the 
(lowing occurs (excepl us prohibited by law) 
A You fail to perform any obligation that you have undertaken in 
this Contract 
B Wo In good f i l th believe that you cannot or will not pay or 
perform the obligations you have agreed to In this Conlract 
If you default you agree to pay our costs for collecting amounts 
ving including without limitation court costs attorneys foes and 
cs for repossession repair storage and sale of Ihe Property 
curing this Contract 
If an cvr nl of default occurs as to any one of you we may 
er rhe our remedies aqain-st any or all of you 
E M E D I E S II you are in dolault on this Contract we have all of the 
medics provided by law and this Contract 
A We may require you to immediately pay us subject to any 
rclund required by law the remaining unpaid balance of the 
imount financed finance ehurges and all othor agreed charges 
B We rrny p ly t 'ues assessments or othor liens or make ropairs 
lo thn Property il you have nol done so We are not required to 
do so Anv amount we pay will be added to the amount you owe 
us ana will be due immodiately This amount wilt earn finance 
charges from th< date paid al the post maturity rale described 
in the PHOMISF TO PAY AMD PAYMENT TERMS section until 
p tKl in full 
C Wo may requirr you to ma,kr Ihe Property available to us at a 
t»laef* w< d< oiynale II"* if is redsonably convenient to >ou a no us 
D / u w> t«r <ri !-•« r ) o*r in *• r .. nn o - F* r r*, y ^ I 
process or sell help IJLI in doing so we may no bread Ihe 
peace or unlawfully niter onto /Ou« piomtses Wc any then sell 
Ihe Property i n d ippl\ \ l n t wr mreivM as pruvuled j> law lo out 
(i ason jok cxprtn*PS and Itien toward your obligations 
f Except w f in i prohibited t»y l i w we ma> sue you foi ir l t l i t toml 
nt- O t V , U H I l T A b H t t M h N I 
amounts if the proceeds of a sale do not pay aff of the amounts 
you uvve us 
Oy choosing uny one o; more of \ho^o rcmodii s we do nol w j i / e 
our right lo later use mo hor remedy By deciding not Jo uso any 
remedy we do not give up our nght to consider the event a default if 
II happens again 
You agree ttiat if any notice Is ruqutrod to be given to you of an 
intended s i l e or transfer of the Proporty notice is reasonable If 
mailed to your last known address as reflected tn our rocords at 
least 10 days before the date of the intended sale or transfer (or such 
other period of time as is required by law) 
You aqree th i t sub|ect to your right to recover such property we 
may take possession of personal property left in or on the Property 
socunng tfiio Contract and takon into possession as provided above 
I N S U R A N C E If required you agroo to buy property Insurance on 
the Property protecting against loss and physical damage and subject 
to a max imum deduct ib le amount indicated in the PROPERTY 
INSURANCE section or as we will otherwise roqutro You will name 
us as loss payee on any such policy In the event of loss or damage to 
the Proporty we may require additional secunty or assurances ol 
payment before wc allow insurance proceeds to be used to repair or 
replace Ihe Property You agroe that tf tho insurance proceeds do noi 
cover the amounts you still owe us you will pay the difference You 
may purchase or provide the Insurance through any insurance 
company reasonably accHptablo to us You will keop Iho insurance In 
full lorce and eltect until this Contruct Is paid in full 
If you tall to obtain or maintain this insurance or name us as a 
loss payee we may obtain insurance to prolect our Interest in the 
Property This insunnce mav include coveragos not required ot you 
This in urancc may bo written by a company other than ono you 
would choose It may be written al a rate higher Uian a rato you could 
obtain if y >u purchased the property insuranco required by this 
Contract We will add the premium tor this insuranco to tho amount 
you owe us Any amount wc pay will be due immediately This 
arnounl will earn tinancu charges from Ihe date paid at the post 
maturity rale di „c nbr ri in the PROMISE TO PAY AND PAYMENT 
*"EMMb s«n. »or unl I p<i d in Jul' 
O B L I G A T I O N S I N D E P E N D E N T Earn person who signs this 
Contr ict agrees tn pay this Contract according to its terms This 
ncdns the lollowinq 
A You musl pay this Contract even if someone else has also 
siui ed i 
B Wc may release any co buyer or guarantor and you will still be 
obligated to pay this Contract 
C Wo may rolease Hny secunty and you will still be obligated to 
p ly thit, Conlraci 
D II we give up any of our rights it will not aflecl your duty to pay 
this Contract 
E It we extend new credit or renew this Contract H wiH not affect 
your duty to pay this Contract 
W A R R A N T Y Warranty information Is provided to you separately 
W A I V E R To the extent permitted by law, you agroe to glvB up 
your r i gh t s to requ i re u i to do c e r t a i n t h i n g s We are n o l 
required to (1) demand payment of amounts duo (2) give notice 
that amounts due have not been p»ld, or have not boon paid in 
the appropriate amount, t ime or manner or (3) glvo notice that 
we intend to make or are making, this Contract Immediately due 
T H I R D P A R T Y A G R E E M E N T 
By signing bolow you agroe to give us a secunty Interest tn the 
Property described In the SALE section You also agree to the 
terms of this Contract including the WAIVER section above 
except that you will not be liable lor the payments it requires Your 
interest in the Proper ty may be used to sat isfy the B u y e r s 
obligation You agree that * e may renew extend change this 
Conlraci or release any party or property without releasing you 
Irom this Contract We may lake t rase steps without notice or 
dcrnond upon you 
You acknowledge receipt of a completed copy o( this Contract 
Signature Dale 
NOTICE ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT 
CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES 
WHICH THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER 
OF GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR 
WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY 
THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE 
OEBTOR HEREUNDER 
ic VQIJ -or
 0 , jv N r A IJsE0 "EHir1 E THE IM rORMWRN 
YOU SEE ON THE WINDOW FORM FOR THIS VEHICLE IS 
PART OF THIS CONTRACT INFORMATION ON THE WINDOW 
FORM OVERRIDES ANY CONTRARY PROVISIONS IN THE 
CONTRACT OF SALE 
ASSIGNMENT BY SELLER 
lloi iclls MK.1 u j t j i c Ibis Hel ui IMM illMiont Conir-»rl »nd r«K-entY Ag»H>nHjru (Cimu irt) lo rtio A sit/nwi its succossors and assigns Including all lis rights 
fl and rnturi M m this Conlncl and any yuniuntoe e-d'culed in COIVIBCIICM with ltd TontJuU S>tH«f gives A^MgrKje lull power oithci in Hs own nun>i or in 
H«r c iiaiiy. to i iWo ««U lixpl or other actum-- which SuHw could havo t «ken undor Ihls Conlraci (SrPARATE AGREEMCNT II tins As3"jrwncnt Is mwJe "undi r 
e terms ol i spf di »le uyret rn»itl" H* moV rtlud on paye 1 tt»c lurtiu ol thu T^igroi* nt u.o dos« nbed n T sopin lo wnling(&) a *t not as provided botow ) 
^(ilh ( wtirrdn(<; 
Thij ConiMCt re pre^t-nlb ,i 5 ilo liy t Her lo Buyer on a Hint prtet IMJI and nol on i cash b isis 
1 he 1 iiumi nis runt nntttt in this Coniricl ar» true and correct 
Tho down payniHitf wns made by the Buyer in the manner stated ot\ p jy * ] ol »w Conir * 1
 dnti ein,opl for Vm ,»ppJ»caiKX» of any fTMinulnclurer t, lebaie no 
pnrt nl tho tViwn p^ni rn i w i lo im«d or pi id 10 tho buyer by Gcllor or Suitor's rooroj.ontativos 
Itus s ilo wns compteted m iceordanro witti all applicable ledural and state law«, nut reyulalion^ 
This Cfinlr it t is, valid and Lntortr* ibte in lucoidnnco witti its lorms 
The names and siu/uturp* on this Conlioct are not forgod llclltioui 01 uj^wne'd and ire true and correct 
this Conirwct lo vu-tod in tho Si Her Iroo of all lions is not subjftct to any claims or dofonses of the Buyor and may bo sokl or assigned by the Seller 
A completely filled in copy of this Contr ict was delivered to the Buyer ot the lime ot onocution 
f hi Vehu le tin" been d« liverod to the Buy« r m good condition and has been accepted b) Buyer 
'rtifoir ft is or will pertri I a socunty interest in tho Properly In favor of the Assignee 
H nny ol U«e^ w irranho- is breai-hcd or untiuc So««w will upon Assiqnnn s drmand purchnso Ihis Conlraci from Assignee The purchabe shall be in cash 
the amount ol the unpaid haHnee fmrkidmq finance charges) plus trie costs and oxpensc.* ot Assignee including attorney"; lees 
Siller wll mlemniy A b j u r e Inr anV tnis sustained by it becauce of (udicial set ott or os the rosull of a rookery made aqainst Assiqneo as a result Of a 
Jim or delense Buyer h r ag mist Gollcr 
SeJkji wwtvc rtotle*1 nl the rtcen|ilnn« e of iriis As.vqnm«nt notice ot non piymont or non poriormanco and notice d any other romodios available to 
4«»ir)ntH. 
A. JJIHM may wtttiout iwiliec to SeHr r riiirl wiihoul affnetmy UIH Iwbility of SeilLi undor ihib A«-biqnniont compound or roloise any rights ayainst and grant 
lonslrHK ol ilmn for piyinnni to bo mide to 6uy«.r and an> othor porson obligated undei Itiis Conlcatt 
4LCr,S OT| t r i IVVI iF INIJtC Al LD Ot^ PACE 1 P US ASSIGNMEM1 lb WtTHr)Ul FtbCOUHSE 
m i HI COunSr If »ti A bigmncnl r mnJe * tr aco « c' H IMJIL ltud on p itjt. t A^ i y i ue Utko thi„ Aj,s»ynn»oni with cernm ughts ot lecouise afpmst 
^ 'L boliri ig LG l ial it Ui Buyfi «l« I T I I K on <ny nbliqiiion of p^ymonl or podnfrmxo undrtr tluu Conlnrt Sailor wl ! uptm demand rnpurt h ISH tt«s 
DETAIL INSTALLMENT CONTRACT 
ANO SECURITY AGREEMENT . 
l « / « 3 / 0 3 
belter 
ACCESS AUTO j t 
"We" and ue mean the Seller above its 
successors and assigns 
Buyer 
SUIIYILLE HARRT 
2 2 3 3 DALLIK ST 
SALT UKX CITT. ITT M 1 W 
"You" and "your" mean each Buyer above and 
guarantor Jointly and Individually 
LE. You nqree to pure/use from us on a time basis subject to tho torms nnd condition:, of this contr i d and socuriry agreement (Contract) the 
tor Vehicle (Vehicle) and sorvnes described below The Vehicle is sold in it, prcbonl condition togather with the USU3I accossonos and atlachments 
2 9 « 3 scriptlon ol Year 
tor Vehicle Make
 H I T S U 8 I S H I 




dc In Yim 
C U R I T Y To secure your payment and pcrtormance under the terms of this Contract you give us a security interest in the Vehicle all 
QSoions attachments accessories and equipment placed in or on the Vehicle together called Properly and proceeds ol the Property 
J albo assign to us and gn.e ui. a security interest m prooouds and premium refunds ol any insurance and service contracts purchased with 
Contract 
O M I S E T O PAY A N O P A Y M E N T T E R M S You promise to pay us the principal amount o l $ 1 2 5 2 2 * ^ $ plus linanee 
iges accruing on the unpaid balance at the rate of 3 _ 3 * « % per year Irum today s date until matunty Finance charges accrue on a 
. day basis After rmtunty or alter vou default and we dennmd payment wo will oarn finance charges on UKJ unpaid 
inco at 3 _ 5 & l _ ' » per year You ayroe to pay this Contract according to the payment «-.chodulfl and late eharyu provisions shown m 
TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES You i lso agree to pay my additional amounts according to the terms and conditions of this Contract 
A D D I T I O N A L F I N A N C E C H A R G E You agruo to pav an additional finance charge ol $ JL/JL »_ that will bo D paid in cash 
added o Ihp Cash Price D paid piuportionally with each payment You agree thai $ I / A ol trie prepaid finance charges 
on norm fjndaOle if ^ou puy this Contr ict in lufl before the maturity date 
WN PAYMENT You also agroc to pay or apply tu ttie Cash Price on or boloro todays dale any cash rebate and net trade in value described 
I P ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT FINANCED D You agree to make deferred payments as pai l ol the cash down payment as reflected in 
r Payrnont Schedule 
T R U T H IN L E N D I N G D I S C L O S U R E S 
A N N U A L 
E R C E N T A G E R A T E 
ic cost ol your credit as 
a yearly rate 
3 , 3 0 * % 
R N A ^ C E 
C H A R G E 
Trie dollar amount the 
credit wilt cost you 
21«1 52 
A » ' C U * T P N A j l C E D 
The amount ol credit 
provided to you or on 
your behalf 
j 12fl29 » • 
T C T \ L O F P / ^ M C N T S 
The amount you will have 
paid when you have made 
all schaduled payments. 
c 1 4 S 3 « . 3 2 
T O T A L o A c E P R I C C 
Tho total cost of your putchas« on 
credit, induing your down payment of 
S * ^ A 
:—r«jans2 
t y m e n t S c h e d u l e Your payment schedule will be 
jmber ol Payments Amount ol Payments When Payments Are Due 
C£ 2 2 6 . 2 2 BOmiLT K a i M I B G 1 1 / 1 9 / W 
c u r i t y You are giving a socunty interest in tlxi Motor Vehicle purchased 
Late Chargo II a payment is more than * _ days late you will be charged 
3 1 o f t l w d*ll iMitt»*t a » o u n t o r * 3 * . *J d a i i « r w f wktnh # v « r 1* g r w r t a x 
s p a y m e n t If you pay off this Contract early you will not havo to pay a penalty 
Q 11) on pay oil this Contract early you may be entitled to a refund of part of the Additional Finance Charge 
H i r e d P r o v i s i o n s You can see the terms of this Contract for any additional information about nonpayment default any required 
ayment before the scheduled date and prepayment refunds and penalties 
EDIT I N S U R A N C E Credit life credit disability (accident and 
th) and any other Insurance covorage quoted bplow are not 
nrod to obtain credit and we will not provide them unless you sign 
agree to pay the additional premium If you want such Insurance 
vlll obtain it lor you (if you qualify for coverage) Wo are quoting 
w ONLY tho coverages you nave chosen to purchase 
dlt Li fe Insurod 
Single Q Joint Prem $ _ 
j i t Disabi l i ty Insured 
Single Q Joint Prem S _ 
~WA~ 
I T E M I Z A T I O N O F A M O U N T F I N A N C 
Vehicle Pnce (mcl sales tax of 5 7 3 9 . M ) S 
Service Contract Paid to ___* $ 
Cash Prlca 5 
Manufacturer's Rebato $ 
Cash Down Payment S 
Deferred Oown Payment $ 
wrr 
1 2 2 3 9 . W 
—M7T 
1 2 2 3 9 7 
1T7X~ 
~K7T 




signalurr below rneuns you want (only) the insurance covenge(s) 
<»d abo e If none aro quoted you have doclined any coverages we 
oo 
Trade In Alluwance S 
Less Amount owmq S 
Paid to (includes I ) 
d Net Trade In (b mmus c ) $ _ 
e Net Cash/Trade In (a plus d ) $ _ 
~X/A~ 
~trr 
=»r d/o/b Buyer d/o.'b 
3 R 0 P E R T Y I N S U R A N C E You must insure the Property sccunng 
Contract You rrwiy purchawi or provide the insurance through any 
ranee company o ison ibty accept iblu to us Tin. collision coverage 
jet bl*» mav n >i exceed S * ' A _ tl you oet msuranco 
oi through us you will pay S * ^ * for 
f Amount io Finance line e (if e is negative) 
Down Payment (e disclose as $0 if negative) 
Unpaid Balance of Cash Price 
Paid to Public Officials Filing Fees 
Insurance Premiums 
Additio»\al Finance Charge(s) Paid lo Seller 
*/A 
_ of coverage 
H/A 
pienuuin is calculated as f o l l ow 
. .M/A Deductible Collision Covorago S 
M/A Deductible Comprehensive Cov $ • ' ^ 
Ve-Tlu ft and Combined Additional Coverage S * ' * 
s M/A 
al l l ty i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e fo r b o d t l y I n j u r y a n d m o t o r 
ic le d u m a g e c a u s o d to o t h e r s is n o t i n c l u d e d in th i s 
l t rac t u n l e s s c h e c k e d a n d i n d i c a t e d 
S I N G L E I N T E R E S T I N S U R A N C E f o u must purchase 
Je Interest insurance as part of this sale transaction /ou may 
base the covorago from a company of your cholco reasonably 
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T i r * T«oc 
Total Other Chorgea/Amounts Pd to Othara 
Lass Prepa id Finance Charge* 
Amount Financed 
*We may retain or receive a portion of this amount 







1 5 3 7 0 * " 






P<«y $ . . l o r . 
of coverago 
SERVICE C O N T R A C T With your purchase of the Vehicle 
agio* to purchase a Service Contract to covor 
This Service Contract wilt be in 
NOTICE TO BUYER 
(1) Do not sign this agreement before you read it or if 
it contains any biank spaces (2) You are entitled to a 
completely flllcd-ln copy of this agreement (3) Under 
the law, you have the right to pay off tn advance the 
full amount due and under certain condit ions to 
obtain a partial refund of the finance charge 
BY SIGNING BELOW BUYER AGREES TO THE TERMS ON 
PAGES 1 AND Z OF THIS CONTRACT AND ACKNOWLEDGES 
RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS CONTRACT 
S I G N M E N T Thts Contract and Security Agreement is assigned 
the Assignee phone 
This issignment is. mado D under the lermt. 
sop >r i l l agreement [~] undor tho lorms ol the ASblGNfv'CNT 
SEt LbH on page «, (~I This issignmoni i t made with rocourso 
Signature] ^ J ^ ~ 
t « / » 5 / © 3 
Date 
ie/e3/03 
Signature O i t e 
1® 
EXHIBIT F 
Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, I REPLY AND OBJECTION 
v. 
Civil No. 080903840 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, 
Judge Kate Toomey 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff, by and through the undersigned counsel, hereby submits its reply to 
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff also objects to 
the Response and objects to this Court's consideration of Defendant's response and all exhibits 
and other offers of evidence. This objection is made due to Defendant's violation of Rules 7, 
10, and 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and because the proposed evidence is 
inadmissible on the grounds of hearsay and lack of proper foundation. 
I. GENERAL OBJECTION 
Plaintiff objects to any consideration of Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Motion for 
UGDEC16 P H 2 - - 5 3 
Summary Judgment. This objection is based on the following: the lack of signature, improper 
form and memorandum exceeding the allowed pages, in violation of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
7 and 10, and 11, and lack of foundation, and is supported by the filings and pleadings of record 
and the argument set forth below. 
Defendant has already been put on notice by this Court of his obligation to abide by the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that his choice to proceed unrepresented by counsel would not relieve 
him of this duty nor allow him special consideration or treatment. Defendant has yet to present 
one piece of admissible evidence in support of his many pages of argument. This most recent 
memorandum is the equivalent of twenty-eight double spaced pages, where the rule mandated 
maximum is five. It is impossible for Plaintiff to fairly and adequately respond to Defendant's 
many points and still stay in compliance with the applicable rules. A proper remedy is to exclude 
the memorandum and offered documents from consideration. 
Therefore, Plaintiff requests that Defendant's response be stricken in its entirety, or in the 
alternative, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court limit its consideration to the first two and 
a half pages of argument, the equivalent of the five page maximum allowed by rule. 
Plaintiff also objects to admission of any and all exhibits submitted by Defendant as well 
as the numerous unsupported facts alleged throughout his memoranda. Defendant has provided 
only one notarized statement, which was neither sworn nor given under penalty of law, the 
substance of which is not even material to the argument before this Court, i.e., the timeliness of 
previous loan payments. Plaintiff's action is based on Defendant's failure to pay the rightfully 
accelerated debt when called due. The prior payments are irrelevant and immaterial. 
Because Defendant has provided no foundation for any exhibit or purported fact, Plaintiff 
requests that this Court strike and not consider all Defendant's exhibits and any purported facts 
set forth in his memoranda, with the clear exception of references to Plaintiffs evidence. 
II. REPLY 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER IN THIS CASE BECAUSE DEFENDANT 
HAS PRESENTED NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Defendant has failed to provide facts which present a genuine issue of material fact in this 
case Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The facts, as presented by Plaintiff in its initial memorandum, remain undisputed. 
Defendant executed the contract containing a security interest in the vehicle. Defendant breached 
that contract by failing, by his own admission, to maintain the vehicle in good working order and 
in his possession. Jordan was within its rights under the contract and applicable law, to repossess 
the vehicle after impound and to accelerate the debt. Defendant was given proper notice under 
the terms of the contract of the repossession and possible sale of his vehicle. That notice was only 
required to be sent to the address he provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs evidence indicates that the 
vehicle was properly sold on January 17, 2008. (Second Aff d of Michelle Rogers). Defendant 
was subsequently notified of that sale and the deficiency, for which he is liable under the contract. 
Notwithstanding his protestations to the contrary, Defendant has not provided any 
admissible evidence to place any of these facts in dispute. Instead, Defendant asks this Court if 
the actions of Plaintiff were prudent or reasonable business practices. This argument is irrelevant 
and immaterial to the case at hand. The prudence of Plaintiff s actions is not at issue in this case, 
only whether such actions were permitted under existing and accepted principles of law. The 
answer to that inquiry must be yes. Plaintiff had a valid contract, which was breached by 
Defendant, entitling Plaintiff to exercise its rights for enforcing the contract. The actions 
precipitating the response by Plaintiff were of the Defendant's own making and choosing. 
Because there is no genuine issue of fact in dispute, Plaintiffs motion should be granted and 
judgment entered against Defendant. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has established, by the evidence, that there was a contract between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, that Defendant materially breached that contract, that his breach was not excused, and 
that Plaintiff was then entitled to enforce the default provisions within that contract. Defendant 
has not provided this court with argument or admissible evidence to place any material part of 
Plaintiffs claim in dispute. Summary judgment is proper in this case and Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that this Court grant Plaintiffs motion and enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff. 
DATED this ^ £ day of December, 2008. 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
By nx?7V 
Douglas A. Oviatt 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
I certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs Reply and Objection to: 
Harry F. Suniville 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
EXHIBIT G 
Richard C. Terry, USB No. 3216 
Douglas A. Oviatt, USB No. 12192 
CORBRIDGE BAIRD & CHRISTENSEN 
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 801/534-0909 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JORDAN CREDIT UNION, 
Plaintiff, I SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE 
ROGERS 
v. 
HARRY F. SUNIVILLE, Civil No. 080903840 
Defendant. | Judge Kate Toomey 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
I, Michelle Rogers, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 
1. I am employed by the Plaintiff, Jordan Credit Union (hereinafter "Jordan"), as a 
Collection Officer. 
2. I am over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts stated 
herein. 
3. I have personal knowledge of and am familiar with the Complaint on file herein. 
The allegations of Jordan Credit Union against the Defendant Harry Suniville are true. 
OGOEC 16 PH 3: 5 3 
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about the 23rd of January, 2008. This was the date noted in the deficiency letter sent to Mr. 
Suniville, however this was actually the date the sale proceeds were applied to the loan. A copy 
of that transaction history is attached hereto as Exhibit A. This record was made 
contemporaneous with the transaction, and is a record regularly kept in the course of business 
5. The sale of the vehicle did in fact occur on January 17, 2008. Attached hereto as 
Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the check from the buyer, dated January 17, 2008. 
6. The delay between the actual sale and the posting of the proceeds was for 
administrative and processing purposes. 
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT 
DATED this _1>L day of ]MMML , 2008. 
Michelle Rogers 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me this /^^day of Uec^^bc^ 
2008, by Michelle Rogers, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that 
she executed the same. 
L ?5?«--
[ \3\3681\579\D.wpd N o t e t y P u b l i c 
XS%v JASON SPENCER 
. ^ ' ' ' ' - V ^ A NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
X^ A* 926° S 300 E 
v \T$/x} SANDY UT 84070 
^"iTL^,> MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 08-25-2009 
Exhibit A 
Account Histories 
1 HARRY F SUNIVILLE 
1418 SO 1100 EAST #5 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84105-
(2427 
Account: 58350-3 
Telephone: (801) 598-0522 
SSH: XXX-XX-3848 j 
Branch: Sandy I 
Association: 
From: 01/01/2008 to 02/01/2008 
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0.00 i 9,104.09 
i 
0.00 j 9,159.09 
i 
0.00 j 8,959.09 
0.00 ; 8,959.09 



















Copyright©2001, SOSystems, Inc 
Exhibit B 
M10VALE ALL SMALL AUTO, INC, 
VENDOR NO. . CHECK HO. 
VOUCHER NO. VENDOR IW. UO. DATE INV. ." GROSS AIUOUNTINV. DISCOUNT NET AMOUNTING 
PERIOD 
ENQ.NG 
EARNINGS AND DECUCTICMS STATEMENT - DETACH eEFORE DEPOSIT! K3-MIDVALE ALL SA«LL AUTO, INC. ~ 
HOURS 
REG. O.T. TOTAL 
EARN'NGS 
qEQULAP OVERTIME - ] OTHER GROSS 
DEDUCTIONS 
KI.C.A i ^ f f - " - ••( ^ x H*^URA\X:E| 
0017662 ' 
MIDVALE ALL SMALL AUTO, INC, 
5930 SOUTH STATE ' • 
MIOVALE. UTAH 84047 
PHONE: 561-2251 ; 
SL£97 
1240 
.^VENDOR j [ xX^^^^WV^^^^Xk: DATS 
/"^ 
PAY TO THE j 





WELLS FARGO BANK 
KORTMWSSTfi'A 
£9SS3U?h .Man Street, 7lh Fbcr 
Sa't Lake Cljy. Utah 84111 
mmmmmmmmammmmam 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of December, 2008,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Michelle Rogers to: 
Harry F. Suniville 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
EXHIBIT H 




Haiiy F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
2U AM 9* 3 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF RON UINCraU&Yici 
f THIRD J « P l C j f t ^ T T 
SM.T 
Case #080903840 
Judge Kate A- Toomey 
My name is Ron Hinckley and I am Harry F. Suniville, Jr's. (#17265) assigned prison 
caseworker while he remains housed at Utah State Prison, Promontory facility. Draper site. The 
attached copy is taken from Harry's "blue packet" and I can confirm and verify that this is a tme 
and accurate, correct copy of information recently considered by the Utah State Board of 
Pardons at Mr, Suniville's Board Hearing. 
Information like this is culled from a variety of official sources such as police reports, 
and Adult Probation and Parole investigative reports. This specific and attached page is copied 
from a Post-Sentencing Report prepared for the Board of Pardons b\ the Utah State Department 
of Corrections * Adult Probation and Parole, relative to a traffic stop by the Salt Lake County 
•Sheriffs Office on 12/03/07, which resulted in his subsequent arrest for alleged DUI/Drugs. 
Based on the attached document, I would feel comfortable to say that yes, his car was obviously 
running up until the time of its impoundment on this date - which is a disputed fact at issue, as I 
understand it, in the case cited above. 
However, to be clear, I cannot personally speak to anything of that: rather, I can onl> 
personally attest that the page attached (Please see Exhibit A, attached) is a legitimate and 
accurate partial copy of an Investigative Post-Sentence Report prepaied b} a certified 
officer/agent of the Department of Corrections' Adult Probation and Parole office. 
I DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT 
THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
FURTHER, THIS AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT. 
EXECUTED ON 2009. 
Ron Hincklcv 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT I AKF ) w 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this 
, 2009, by [ 
dav of 
signer of the 
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same. 
My Commission Expires Notary Seal 
VTA * , &*%. 
%*&' 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document (AFFIDAVIT OF RON 
HINCKLEY) was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date 
specified, for Case #080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS ^C^ davof •&&* , 2009. 
univille, Jr., PRO SE lacfy F 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
Inmate Number *« 
Inmate Housing / ^ V ^ ff^/^ ^ 7 
Utah State Pnson 
P O Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020-0250 
2 3 FEB 2 0 0 9 PM 2. T 
USA 42 
4& S«* &**- ^ %t^^ 
EXHIBIT I 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
PROSE 
#17265 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
fa* &ur+Cfrk v 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKE CFIiEg BlSTBttifr COUBT 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 
Defendant/Respondent 
vs. 
Jordan Credit Union 
Plaintiff 
NOTICE TO COURT, 
AND TO PLAINTIFF, 
REGARDING NEW EYi 
Case #080^03840 
I hird Judicial District 
FEB 2 h 2009 
ALT u\|<E COUNTf 
eputy Clerk 
Judge Kate A, Toomey 
. . i i-^ 
Comes now before this Court. Harry F. Suniville, Jr., PRO SE, and as IV * Vtp/ Midh in 
£W /Wv4(U^A_ 
mltffimj^^ 
ttppmfts fr\w/*f>> / faw Aavi/fes- etfr-fr-far* far (9xn>^ 
~6yft) i$e#Af&?f. -fas* ZfZpz {faf*9 * ^ g g * r 
Office - White 
^(f^Y^?1 
1W* **AM1 








w&f~fi^&e~ fx*&&Y fas 
P/M&/ Aj^wfo ^^f^^^SSe^, ^syipm^i^^ 
\5^ reJeftX(/?fa (^^ 
W ^ ^ y ^ / 4 rffvyfy* fy '&&"W* tVc/s/c*/ PMf"7%(A^svpf'r"'1 
tain •%££ -6? &i>^/^tffk & &, zhJ-rffa/' 'srAxs *$&, &*6$zguL 
CTr»XTATTTTl>T? y \JTL*.PA 
^ ^ m m M M i f i i i f f i i 
USP# /^z-<^"~ 
OFFENDER* 
LAST NAME ^ // FIRST , MIDDLE 
Tk&W % "ThX" fr 
<zr//#4'fa ^^m^^f^^'&v 
^/fcnc^mf] /r/irrtf 171SA//Y///&- d*/cs/Wf /*/ nw e*^l$2> frZMu dfr/knc^mf~} l^flfYCf iflsfAZ/Yz/fa wts/A/f r s)^l$  frzk
9%ticks &&Sr&#- fr!wzif?€r a•/%$&>, &f> 
£c-^&l(cf4kT& M K ^ ; me -TCrtrffaifr&ib/ effetej^-Au^^ P^y^-^/" 
C£U 
V-
^£rtd^^%//^C'M?/fr3^ ?f£M&wW*lSt*f£torPj &&, U7t 
IGNATURR ' 5# £/#££</> , ^ / ^ r* Annr 7V-, . / 
MIRROR IMAGE 
AUTO/BODY & PAINT 
608 W. CENTER STREET 






J Phone # 
801-748-4993 
I HARRY SUNNYVILLE 
2003 MITSUBISHI ECLIPSE 
1 Description 
j REPLACE RH FENDER 
[LABOR 
j REPAINT RH FENDER 




















Motor Vehicles could confirm and verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this part of our statement, 
regarding these October \ehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing 
certifications. 
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SA1TH NAUGHT. 
EXECUTED ON F e b . fo ,2009. 
BY 
BY: 
ST A.TE OF T TT AH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
__ Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this 
fO day of K b . . 2009, by gWin th w^rCiX- & 
• • . signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he/she executed the same. 
My Commission Expires <p> - >% - gQ<s°| Notary Seal 
Mirror Image Auto Bod\ and Paint 
608 W. Center Street 
Mid\ale.UT 84047 
Officer Barrett booked the defendant into the Salt Lake Adult Detention Center for Possession of 
Cocaine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, DUI third offense, Driving on an Alcohol Revoked 
License, and Driving Without an Interlocking Device as well as other outstanding warrants. 
Exhibit "A 
RESTITUTION: 
There is no restitution determined in this case. 
CUSTODY STATUS: 
Judge Atherton from the Salt Lake Third District Court sentenced Mr. Suniville to the Utah State 
Prison on October 10, 2008, for a term of 0-5 years for case #071909070. Mr. Suniville is 
currently serving this sentence. 
CRIMINAL HISTORY UPDATE: 
(Update any arrest/convictions since the last Pre/Post Sentence Report). 
DATE ARRESTING AGENCY OFFENSE DISPOSITION 
/10/2008 Salt Lake County Sheriff WA- Theft, Felony No Disposition , 
WA- Possession of a Controlled Substance, Felony 
WA- DUI, Felony 
720/2008 Adult Probation and Parole BW- Possession of Drug Paraphernalia Justice Court Warrant 
2 
Inmate Number L r r* us s 
Inmate Housing^. 
Utah State Prison 
PO Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
&S1EMS?J7 jfiQ^SSa 
g ^f^,/ -^ssssisstmss? PITNEV B O W I 
02 1P $ 0 0 . H d 
0002430782 
MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 8 40 
9999GC2000 VMff, 
o~ j i 7b^ n T d i»-i»n\j 
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ftp, 0rt f&# 
'•& f</fT&'ft 7e#M&) y 
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EXHIBIT J 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CIVIL COURT, SALT LAKfcfiQ&ftJTOfl^ 
Harry F. Suniville, Jr. 09 FEB 25 M 9- U 2 
Defendant/'Respondent AFFIDAVIT / DECLARATOR yisTRiCT 
FROM MIRROR i l | K | j L W ^ N T Y 
BODY AND PAINT 
VS. BY-^g^yvT^LERK 
Jordan Credit Union Case # 080903840 
Plaintiff 
Judge Kate A. Toomey 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Dick and Shannon U^lfi / Ok , do solemnly state as follows: 
1. I am/We are over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal knowledge of the facts 
set forth below. 
2. I am a certified mechanic (or wife and business partner) and I have worked in the 
automotive repair industry practically all my life (for number of years). My main areas 
of professional expertise are auto body repairs and painting. 
3. I/We derive our income from a business centered around that same expertise, and we 
call our company Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint. Our business address is currently located 
at 608 W. Center Street, Midvale, UT. 84047. 
4. We are both well acquainted with Harry F. Suniville, Jr.. because on several occasions 
in the past we have been asked to perform inspection, estimation, and auto body repairs, plus 
painting sendees, on a succession of different Mitsubishi Eclipse automobiles owned by him, 
starting with autumn, 2003. 
5- On or about October 9th, 2007, we were asked by Hairy F. Suniville, Jr., to inspect his 
cayenne red 2003 model year Mitsubishi Eclipse, and to provide a repair estimate for the work 
that would be required to fix a dent on this car's passenger-side front fender. I believe he might 
have explained at that time that this newer dent on his car had been caused by a drunken 
apartment-complex neighbor. 
6- At the time of this estimation for new repair services required, there were then 
pending between us, by previous verbal contract and understanding, some as-yet-unmadc repairs 
to this same car's front bumper panel. At that time, Harry had credit at our shop sufficient 
enough to pay for an after-market front fiberglass bumper panel, and for the painting which 
would be required to fix his front end entirely; and these repairs were put on hold and left 
pending at customer's request, until such time as he could come up with the money required to 
pay for the newest repairs (to his front fender.) At that time, it was our plan that then all of the 
needed auto body repairs could be made at once and simultaneously. This is always the better 
plan because then all required auto body painting can be flawlessly matched. 
7. At the time of this, the last estimate on record at our shop, it is my belief, and my 
strong recollection, that for the final estimate price of $511.81, (body work parts and labor,) 
Harry's car could have been fixed up and made cosmetically (from an auto body and paint 
perspective,) "good as new" - that is, restored to a 'showroom quality' condition of repair. We 
have submitted a true and correct copy of this formal Repair Estimate, and it is attached to this 
hereto as Exhibit A. 
8. Furthermore, I know for a fact that Harry's front bumper assembly, although broken 
off in places at the bottom, needed no new front bumper support, (a $95.00 part,) because Harry-
had already paid for a new front bumper support: one which we previously had installed for him 
as a cash purchase, and because he wanted to ensure himself- while replacement of tlie broken 
fiberglass front bumper panel remained in limbo - that all the other extrinsic and attached parts 
of the bumper assembly, and that didn't need repair, nor replacement, as they were already "good 
as new" (that is, reflector plastic, turn signal lights, and both front headlight assemblies) could 
stay solidly affixed - without shake or rattle. In other words, his broken front bumper fiberglass 
was previously, at our shop, and by one of our mechanics, firmly tied down to a brand new, 
replacement, front bumper support. 
9. Now, I have had opportunity just recently to read a document submitted to this Court 
by Jordan Credit Union titled "Declaration of Ken Martinez" and it is my honest opinion: freely 
submitted here in consideration of "front bumper support," falsely alleged as needed, and many 
other seeming inconsistencies, also, but mostly based upon my/our own personal knowledge and 
recall - and especially submitted in the interest of simple justice - that he (this "Ken Martinez") 
is plainh King with regards to the state of, and condition of repairs on Harry's car. 
10. For one thing, I have already stated what I know about the front bumper support. 
And I want to personally contradict the testimony of this "Ken Martinez" relative to same, 
because we know by our own shop's records, and personal knowledge, that this front bumper 
support allegedly needed had already been replaced! 
11. In truth, I/we find this "Declaration of Ken Martinez" plainly laughable and 
i i-_ _ _ i—rtlirio kv nmfAocuw»i ^vn^nViirp nnhodv can accurately price anything (neither 
after-market used parts, nor new, factory/replacement parts,) without first knowing the exact 
model year of the car to which estimates are being made. Additionally, it is plain to me that this 
is a fraudulent and greatly exaggerated assessment of the true condition of Harry's car, and I/we 
base this opinion on personal knowledge of Harry's car as I/we last saw it in October '07. 
12. Accordingly, I now have had occasion to read Harry's answer to the lawsuit 
complaint to which he has subsequently been forced to defend himself. Specifically, I/we have 
now have had an opportunity to actually read parts of Harry's answer to this lawsuit, and the case 
he makes therein (called MEMORANDUM AND REPLY SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S [ORIGINAL] COMPLAINT, AND AS AN 
OPPOSING RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT) @ §3, §5, §6, §8, 
§9, §10 on Pages 4-7, AND, based upon my/our personal and professional knowledge of this car 
in question, particularly in regards to this car's actual and true condition of repair - as we 
personally know and recall it to be in October '07 - we both wish to weigh in and hereby attest 
and testify under oath that to the very best of our knowledge and belief, Everything that Harry 
has told this Court and stated therein is factually true. 
13. Moreover, based upon my own professional knowledge and experience, when an 
automobile's car ignition system requires a computer chip ignition key to operate, and as Harry's 
2003 Mitsubishi required, that car will simply not start and run for more than a second or two, 
until, with a computer code supplied only by Mitsubishi Motors, a new computer chip key has 
been made to order by key-code specifications. It is an expensive proposition then to duplicate 
such a key; and locksmiths typically charge $125.00 and more to duplicate an ignition key that is 
capable of operating the car. 
14« Also, based upon my professional experience, if everything wrong with Harry's car 
were really true - all that this wvKen Martinez" has alleged - then there is not a mechanic in this 
world who would have passed the car for safety and emissions testing and certification, as I 
personally know would have been required for Harry*s mandatory, by end-of-October deadline, 
in order that the current registration be renewed with new current-registration (October) stickers, 
as required by the Utah State Department of Motor Vehicles. In fact, we both do actually recall 
that the expense of this was one of the reasons why our own Mirror Image body shop repairs 
wrere left pending and in 'limbo' at that time, back in October when the last formal Mirror Image 
Estimate of Repairs was deferred and postponed pending the availability of the last $500.00 or so 
required with the plan being that, then, all of the then-pending repairs required to perfectly 
restore Harry's car to a showroom quality of repairs could be made all at once, then 
simultaneously painted, all at once. Cerlainlv. official reoonk 'M th<- ihuh <zt*i*> n^or+™<w „f 
Motor Vehicles could confirm and verify, corroborate, the accuracy of this part of our statement, 
regarding these October vehicle registration - and prerequisite safety and emissions testing 
certifications, 
WE BOTH DO SOLEMNLY DECLARE UNDER CRIMINAL PENALTY OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
FURTHER, THESE AFFIANTS SAITH NAUGHT. 







BY: Mirror Image Auto Body and Paint 
608 W. Center Street . 
Midvale,UT 84047 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Subscribed, sworn to, and acknowledged before me on this 
_day of . 2009, by _ & 
, signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he/she executed the same. 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing and attached document 
(AFFIDAVIT/DECLARATION FROM MIRROR IMAGE AUTO BODY AND PAINT) 
was sent to the following people by FIRST CLASS, PREPAID MAIL, on the date specified, for 
Case #080903840. 
TO: Richard C. Terry and Douglas Oviatt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
39 Exchange Place 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84111 
DATED THIS j f £ ^ _ _ _ d a y of /^ftfUX&^Cj , 2009 
miville, Jr., PRO SE 
#172/ 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT. 84020 
